Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
effective design is achieved. This tipping point
remains the most compelling standardization
research question and exists in nearly all fields.
After this tipping point is reached, standardiza-
tion becomes a useful strategy for risk manage-
ment. Risk includes the potential for negative
impact from vulnerabilities threatened by future
events. Standardization can reduce those risks from
both predictable and unpredictable events when
these risks jeopardize product quality, product
failure, quality of professional services, health
and safety, environmental protection, firm opera-
tions, financial flexibility, legal rights, political
influence, competition, labor and employment,
and resource or commodity availability. Many of
these risks impact the development of sustainable
business models for environmental protection.
limited, such as when they arise ad hoc and the
SDO disbands when completed, they are gener-
ally called consortia (Albert and Burke 2004).
De jure standards generally constrain everyone
while de facto, consortia, and VCS standards are
voluntary for those who choose to participate.
Of course, the choice not to participate may be
illusory because some standards achieve critical
mass and monopolize an activity. For example, it
would be difficult and costly to achieve wireless
local area communications in environmental sen-
sor networks without complying with the IEEE
802.11 standard.
Sometimes de facto standards are considered
informal standards because they are not devel-
oped or imposed by recognized governmental or
professional standards bodies. When a proprietary
standard becomes widely used or even dominant,
it becomes a de facto standard. Free and competi-
tive economies regularly rely on de facto standards
because they encourage liberty essential to demo-
cratic societies. No direct endorsement from an
SDO or government regulator is needed for a de
facto standard to achieve critical mass because
widespread successful product sales cause it to
become the standard. While de facto standards
are common in many unregulated products such
as computer operating systems and other infor-
mation and communications technologies (ICT),
they are less prevalent for products and services
that have direct and strong impact on health and
safety or the environmental. Still, monopolists
strive to dominate markets with by setting de facto
standards through competitive success for their
products. There are democratic process problems
with proprietary and de facto standards because
they lack political checks and balances before
they are imposed (ex ante). Furthermore, some de
facto standards are also closed standards because
they are neither transparent nor fully accessible
permitting the owner to discriminate against us-
ers. As with other dominant standards, de facto
standards generally impose high switching costs
TYPES OF STANDARDS
The imprecise classification of standards contrib-
utes to misunderstanding. This section provides
some structure to this classification scheme to
further understanding of standards development
activities (SDAs) and their relationship to envi-
ronmental standardization. Standards emanate
from various sources and are developed in three
primary ways. First, a de facto standard arises when
a proprietary technology achieves broad market
success. Second, de jure standards are generally
imposed by legislation or are developed by gov-
ernment regulatory agencies that have domain
expertise in the field standardized. For example,
most pollution emissions control requirements are
de jure standards because government regulators
with expertise in environmentalism are authorized
by statute to promulgate emissions controls as de
jure standards. Third, voluntary consensus stan-
dards (VCS) arise increasingly in private-sector
venues known as standards development organi-
zations (SDO). For example, VCS standardiza-
tion is often developed by industry participants.
