Environmental Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Treatment for All Ships principle. The equal
treatment duty towards all ships implies that no
party of the IMO is allowed to impose training,
experience, or certification requirements to sea-
farers serving on board ships entitled to fly the
flag of another state and engaged on near-coastal
voyages in a manner resulting in a more stringent
way for such seafarers than for seafarers serving on
board a ship entitled to fly their own flag. Based
on this principle, therefore, the GHG reduction
from ships should be binding and equally appli-
cable to all ships, thus requiring States to accept
similar regulations and/or standards in other fora
(Mankabady, 1973).
Developed countries make it clear that only
equal treatment can help to resolve GHG emis-
sions (Buhaug
et al
., 2009). Most registered fleets
presently fly the flags of non-Annex I countries.
If ships are treated differently based on whether
they are Annex I country flags or non-Annex I
country flags, ships can easily change their flags
to have a non-Annex I country nationality due to
the flag of convenience in the shipping industry,
which would nullify international effort to reduce
GHG from ships (Buhaug
et al
., 2009).
the context of addressing climate change but is
silent on international shipping and aviation. By
comparison, IMO's mandate is derived from the
IMO Convention and United National Convention
on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); there are no conflict
or jurisdiction subordinations between the two for
developing nations on their flags (IMO, 2009e).
They also suggest that Article 2.2 of the Kyoto
Protocol recognize that IMO is the appropriate
forum in which vessel-based GHG reduction
regulation should be discussed and enforced. It
restricts itself to imposing upon countries in Annex
I the obligation to work through IMO to “pursue
limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse
gases” from international shipping (IMO, 2009e).
They argue that concepts such as the CBDR
have limit. The objective of achieving reduction or
limitation of GHG emissions from ships engaged
on international voyages cannot be accomplished
if some ships are exempted from IMO ship-based
GHG reduction regulations purely on the basis
that flag ships fly (IMO, 2009e).
The View of the WWF and IMERS
As a compromise, the World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
and International Maritime Emission Reduction
Scheme (IMERS) propose the application of
market-based instruments with consideration of
CBDR (IMERS, 2007; IMO, 2008b). The market-
based policy instruments generate revenues, and
these revenues are then distributed to different
country groups with different percentages. De-
veloped countries would pay the reduction costs
but only receive a limited amount. Other countries
receive would more funds than they generate. The
least developed countries small island develop-
ing states would receive the largest shares. The
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China)
would receive more than they have paid as well.
The shares of revenue payment and receipts are
listed in Table 5 (IMERS, 2007; IMO, 2008b).
In this proposal, the disadvantage of the small
The View of the Sub-
Division for Legal Affairs
The Sub-Division for Legal Affairs in IMO identi-
fied no potential conflicts between the CBDR in
Kyoto Protocol and Equal Treatment under IMO.
Instead, they suggest that the IMO should use the
Equal Treatment principle to guide future ship
emission reduction negotiations (IMO, 2009e).
The Sub-Division for Legal Affairs suggests
that the Kyoto Protocol should be an agreement
under the framework of the UNFCCC. The CBDR
under Kyoto Protocol is a soft law. So it does
not exclude the application of specific technical
requirements and obligations developed pursu-
ant to particular treaty law areas, such as the
maritime law (IMO 2009e). The Kyoto Protocol
