Policy instruments (2) - Transport Policy and Planning in Great Britain - page 212

can attach Traffic Regulation Conditions concerning route or stopping arrangements
if objections are raised by the police or highway authorities on the grounds of safety
or traffic congestion. In theory operators could be sanctioned if they proved not to be
running services reliably and punctually in accordance with registrations but neither
the Traffic Commissioners nor local authorities have had the resources to monitor
conditions comprehensively.
The Buses White Paper was unequivocal about the benefits which would flow from
the competition created by the combination of deregulation and privatisation:
The legislation will make major changes to arrangements for the bus industry
so that it is set free to give a better service to the passenger at less cost to the
ratepayer and taxpayer.
(DTp 1984 para 1.13)
In practice the outcome was much more mixed. Certainly the profit motive and
exposure to competition had the effect of driving down unit costs (Glaister et al.
2006 chapter 7). These economies together with more efficiently designed routes
and schedules enabled about 85% of previous services to be registered commercially.
Comparatively few 'gaps' (other than in rural areas) were therefore left for local
authorities to fill by competitive tendering for 'socially necessary services'.
However despite additional bus mileage being operated, in total the hoped-for
gains in patronage did not materialise - in fact the reverse. The haemorrhaging of
passengers was particularly serious in the metropolitan areas where the removal of
subsidy resulted in an initial hike in real fares of more than 20%. In addition wasteful
competition on profitable routes, loss of co-ordinated ticketing and information and
confusion arising from frequent service changes were further negative influences.
London escaped the 1985 Act largely because of an accident of timing, since the
Government had recently taken control of London Transport from the GLC and was
already embarked on a different plan. A combination of route franchising and the
break-up and sale of London Transport Buses was pursued instead. Unintentionally a
live experiment in contrasting regulatory regimes was thereby set in motion (Preston
2003).
Not only was the London model very different in kind (based on a planned network
with control of services, fares and ticketing) it was also introduced incrementally over
a 10-year period. Until the late 1990s London experienced similar increases in bus
mileage and real fares as the metropolitan areas but in a co-ordinated manner. The
outcomes for patronage were strikingly different (Figure 13.1). Although there are
special factors at work in London (e.g. its much higher proportion of tourists) the
scale of the difference has provided ready ammunition for those arguing in favour of
introducing a similar regulatory model elsewhere.
Partnerships
Prior to the 1997 election the Labour Party was proposing re-regulation of some kind,
but once in government rejected this in favour of the more business-friendly model
of voluntary partnerships which had already been established in some places (DETR
1999b).
'Quality Partnerships' (QPs) are agreements between one or more operators
and a local transport authority designed to bring about complementary investment