A new deal for transport? - Transport Policy and Planning in Great Britain - page 133

for 'communities' into reality. The Department of Transport appeared not to have been
involved in the preparation of the Plan and made clear that it did not anticipate the
hard-won resources of the Ten Year Transport Plan being diverted into catering for the
needs of growth areas!
The growth areas initiative reflected an increasingly important Treasury view
that high house prices could be remedied by additional housing supply (Barker
2004). The planning system was considered one of the major constraints. It had
already come in for criticism on account of inordinate delays in plan preparation
and because excessive detail and negative, bureaucratic attitudes were said to stifle
business enterprise.
All these complaints and more were registered in a Green Paper published at the
end of 2001 (DTLR 2001). This proposed wholesale upheaval of the development
plan system whose basic form had operated since 1968. Notwithstanding a mix of
misgiving and outright opposition the proposals went ahead largely unchanged under
the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004. At a strategic level the main change
was the abolition of structure plans and the elevation of RPG to statutory status as a
'regional spatial strategy' (Chapter 18).
8.9 Clearing the decks - the 2004 White Paper
Despite the raft of initiatives from the New Deal and the increased investment in the
Ten Year Plan it was soon apparent that failure of several key elements meant that
most of the hoped-for outcomes would not materialise. The lack of local enthusiasm
for urban charging schemes and the impracticability of the procedures set up around
statutory Quality Bus Partnerships and Contracts meant that the provisions included
in the 2000 Transport Act for these measures took on the status of white elephants.
The Government's change in policy on fuel duty contributed to a situation where
after 2000 the rate of traffic growth increased compared with the slowing which had
occurred previously. Even without this the Department of Transport had had to own
up to a technical error which meant that the Ten Year Plan's much-vaunted impact on
traffic congestion was a misrepresentation. Instead of achieving an overall reduction
by 2010, it was likely to increase by between 11% and 20% (DfT 2002a).
On the railways by 2004/05 the train operators had only recovered half of the losses
in punctuality and reliability incurred during the year after Hatfield. The previous
growth in rail use was seriously dented and the Government had to abandon the targets
it had set in the Ten Year Plan. The bulk of the additional rail investment envisaged
had had to be diverted to maintaining and renewing the existing railway, rather than
bringing about hoped-for enhancements. Cost escalation also had ramifications for the
25 light rail projects envisaged in the Plan. Schemes which had reached an advanced
state of preparation in Leeds and Portsmouth were abandoned whilst extensions to the
systems in Manchester and Birmingham were stalled.
The limbo into which railway developments were cast post-Hatfield had the effect
of removing them from regional and local transport planning exercises since it was
not possible to enter into any forward commitment. In particular the 'multi-modal'
credentials of the motorway corridor studies were demolished at a stroke since no
matter what they might recommend in the way of rail enhancements there was very
little probability of schemes being implemented.
This series of calamities distorted the composition and trajectory of the Government's
strategy actually being implemented . CfIT noted this imbalance and registered concern