A new deal for transport? - Transport Policy and Planning in Great Britain - page 130

embarrassment to the Government he was replaced as Transport Secretary by Alistair
Darling in May 2002.

8.7 Breaking the Logjam - urban road user charging
The proposal to allow local authorities to introduce road user charging - and to retain
the net revenues - was regarded by John Prescott as his major achievement in the
haggling which went on within Government over the measures to be included in the
New Deal . As the title of the 'daughter document' on the subject implied - Breaking
the Logjam (DETR 1998c) - the new instrument was seen as central in overcoming the
deadlock of urban traffic congestion.
The idea that some form of direct charging of road users should be used to
influence urban traffic demand had been debated since the 1960s. However, despite
its impeccable credentials as an example of market economics Mrs Thatcher's nose for
popular opinion led her to prohibit any official investigation of the subject. Only after
her departure did the Department of Transport return to the idea as part of its growing
interest in fiscal instruments generally. By a nice irony one of the conclusions of a
major research exercise was that, if this new, difficult and potentially fallible measure
was to be proceeded with, the one place which should not be used to test it was London
(MVA Consultancy 1995)!
Following consultation on the 'Logjam' document powers were given to local
authorities in the Transport Act 2000 (and separately to the new Mayor of London in
1999). They allowed for two types of charging:

1 direct charges on drivers using roads in their area (which could be implemented

in a variety of ways - by cordon pricing, supplementary licensing, electronic
metering etc.)

2 workplace parking levies - charges on employers based on the number of private

parking spaces they provided for their employees.

The Ten Year Plan and projections of its impact were based on the expectation of
road user charging being introduced in eight of the largest towns and cities outside
London and a further twelve workplace parking schemes. In terms of practical
outcomes as well as credibility of the Government's overall strategy it was therefore
little short of calamitous that this initiative proved an (almost) complete failure.
The Government worked with interested authorities behind the scenes in a
'charging partnership' but was careful publicly to emphasise that decisions were a local
matter. This appeared as a less than whole-hearted commitment to the principle of
charging and gave the impression that the Government was hedging its bets against
unpopular or unsuccessful outcomes.
Another impediment to implementation was the absence of 'up-front' funding (LTT
282). Everyone including the Government recognised that tangible improvements
would be needed in public transport before it would be politically feasible to impose
charging on motorists. However the Government was not prepared to sanction
additional funding for this purpose and, because of deregulation, councils were unable
to determine bus fares or services anyway.
The significance of the public transport aspect is highlighted by what happened in
London - 'the one that got away'. Not only is the base level of public transport service
and use much higher in Central London but following the transfer of powers to the