The 1990s paradigm shift - Transport Policy and Planning in Great Britain - page 113

generally more sympathetic but there were doubts about whether the policies could
be applied sufficiently intensively and over a long enough period to have a significant
impact (Ove Arup and Partners 1997). The fear was that development industry would
in effect boycott the PPG and seek to force the Government into adopting policies
more in line with market forces. There were also doubts about whether the new
development policies could be delivered and achieve the desired transport outcomes
in the absence of national transport policies aimed at reducing overall traffic volumes.
Certainly this particular nettle had yet to be grasped.
7.6 Environmental assessment
The overall concept of sustainable development was only the most 'high-level'
expression of the increasing attention being paid to the environmental impacts of
transport. During the 1970s, concern over the impact of major road schemes had led
to the adoption of methods for undertaking and presenting environmental appraisals
(DTp 1983a), although these focused on the more immediate (i.e. localised) impacts.
In 1985 the EC issued a Directive (85/337) on the environmental assessment
of major projects in general. This included guidance on the preparation of a more
comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and a requirement that its
results should be presented publicly in the form of an Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS). In the UK regulations were issued in 1988 making it compulsory for certain
types of project, including major transport infrastructure proposals, to have an EIA
accompanying their planning application.
Considerable controversy followed over the way in which the requirements of
the Directive should be incorporated into the planning procedures for major road
schemes then in progress. The issue came to a head in 1992 in connection with the
proposed final section of the M3 London-Southampton motorway near Winchester.
This was an extremely contentious scheme as it involved excavating a deep cutting
through Twyford Down - an area of valuable landscape replete with ancient burial
sites scheduled as historic monuments. The proposal had a long and difficult history
and the Government was anxious to avoid the further delay and uncertainty which
would result from reopening investigations into its environmental impact.
Appeals by objectors resulted in the unprecedented step of the EC Environment
Commissioner Carlo Ripa di Meana publicly requesting a halt to construction of the
scheme. The issue took on wider political significance as the Prime Minister, John
Major, was about to assume Presidency of the European Council of Ministers, and
relations between the British Government and the EC were extremely sensitive at
the time (Haigh and Lanigan 1995). The EC was anxious to gain Britain's acceptance
of the Maastricht Treaty and Ripa di Meana's intervention was precisely the sort of
'meddling' in national affairs which the Conservative Government was able to exploit
in support of its Eurosceptic position. In the event Ripa di Meana left the Commission
and the planning procedure already followed for the Twyford Down scheme was
accepted as amounting to an impact assessment.
The Department of Transport's resistance to the possibility that existing road
proposals might be open to re-examination was affirmed in its response to a report from
SACTRA (1992). The report had emphasised the need for a more strategic approach
so that the cumulative effect of successive, linked schemes could be examined (so-
called 'corridor assessment'). The Government agreed to issuing revised guidance in