The Conservatives after 1979 - Transport Policy and Planning in Great Britain - page 103

which had conveniently been protected from other development during the previous
30 years by green belt designation!
From the day of its opening, traffic volumes on the M25 were much higher than
planned and the resulting congested traffic conditions have entered the nation's
folklore. Although planned as London's version of the 'bypass' for long-distance traffic
promised when the trunk roads programme was launched before World War II, the
road also functions as the outermost 'ringway' for the city itself, the inner rings never
having been built.
Economic growth during the 1980s resulted in noticeably worse traffic conditions
generally. (Road traffic increased nationally by a quarter in the five years from 1984
to 1989.) The Confederation for British Industry (CBI) and many other business
organisations campaigned for increased transport investment in general and roads in
particular. Crucially the CBI stressed the economic threat which congestion posed to
the well-being of London and to the country as a whole in relation to its European
competitors (CBI 1989). Its estimate that congestion was costing the nation £15
billion a year - more than £10 a week for every household - was a particularly effective
campaigning weapon that was frequently quoted in policy debates for several years
afterwards.
The economic link was acknowledged by the Government in the title of its
White Paper 'Roads for Prosperity' published in 1989. The paper was prompted by
an upward revision in national road traffic forecasts (NRTF) consequent on recent
trends which pointed to an increase in traffic levels of between 83% and 142% by 2025
(DTp 1989b). The Government's response was to propose a doubling of national roads
expenditure to produce what Ministers claimed would be 'the biggest road building
programme since the Romans'.
Increasing traffic congestion was affecting all parts of the nation's road network. A
notable feature of the White Paper therefore was the argument that different criteria
applied to its inter-urban component:
Much can be done in urban areas by using modern techniques of traffic
management to ease congestion and delays; but people accept that the scope is
limited. Road users do not expect, however, to endure stop-start conditions on
ordinary journeys between cities.
(DTp 1989d paras 8-9)
This of course overlooks the fact that many of the 'ordinary' journeys on the M25
and other motorways represent commuting and other journeys taking place within
individual city regions.
The Government explained that it had considered various ways to eliminate
unacceptable levels of congestion on inter-urban roads. The main alternatives to road-
building were all swiftly dismissed in a few paragraphs - an interesting feature since
little more than a decade later a completely opposite management-led approach came
to be adopted instead (8.9).
When details of the programme were published they included widening most of
the M1 and M25 as well sections of most other motorways leading to and around the
main conurbations (DTp 1990). The emphasis on widening rather than on new routes
is significant. Although it had the virtue of lessening overall environmental impact its
key political advantage was that it could be implemented more easily. In most cases
the widening could be accomplished within the land envelope of the existing road,