The Conservatives after 1979 - Transport Policy and Planning in Great Britain - page 100

When after 1984 the TSG paid to local authorities was confined to major highway
schemes the possibility of capital spending on new urban rail schemes outside London
was all but forgotten about. However the combination of rapid growth in road traffic
volumes plus the association of the novel Docklands light rail system with successful
urban regeneration prompted a number of authorities to consider the possibilities of
light rail. At the head of the queue was Greater Manchester which had had to abandon
its heavy rail Picc-Vic scheme. The PTA now came forward with a cheaper proposal
known as 'Metrolink' which connected suburban lines to Bury and Altrincham on
either side of the conurbation via new on-street tracks across the city centre. The
system was in effect dual-mode, operating as a conventional train on the suburban
lines, but as a tram through the city centre.
In the absence of TSG the possibility of a central government grant would have to be
pursued by separate application for a grant under section 56 of the 1968 Transport Act
which was still on the statute book. In 1989 the Government set out the terms under
which applications would be considered (DTp 1989a). These represented a radical
departure from anything contemplated previously. Instead of schemes being assessed
and grant paid on the basis of the total social benefits relative to cost, only benefits
to non-users of the system were to be included, i.e. reductions in traffic congestion,
accidents etc. and any economic benefits that could not be captured directly through
developer contributions. (Benefits to users were expected to be recouped through
higher fares.) Furthermore, in the Manchester case, construction and operation for
an initial 25 years was to be carried out under a concession to be bid for competitively
on the basis of a company's contribution to the scheme's initial capital cost. (Actual
services were to be run without subsidy.)
The rash of light rail schemes being considered by authorities elsewhere quickly
diminished when the stringency of the Government's criteria became apparent and
when it became clear that the total grant available even for acceptable schemes would
be strictly rationed. Initial hopes for developer contributions also faded as the difficulty
was recognised of actually securing them (given that established developments could
enjoy a 'free ride' without contributing) and as the bubble of the 1980s property boom
burst.
The cause of new light rail schemes was also not well served by the second proposal
to be approved - the Sheffield Supertram - whose patronage and financial performance
proved well below expectations. The go-ahead for two further schemes (Croydon
Tramlink and Midland Metro between Wolverhampton and Birmingham) was given
in 1994, but thereafter the Government indicated that approval of additional schemes
was unlikely and urged local authorities to explore cheaper bus-based rapid transit
solutions instead.
6.7 The re-making of development planning
Work on producing the new structure and local plans required by the 1968 Town and
Country Planning Act sat uneasily alongside the fact that the planning system was
increasingly unable to influence actual development outcomes (Brindley et al. 1989)
since investment by the private sector was assuming increasing importance.
The zeal with which the public ownership and regulation of development was
attacked post-1979 was no less than in the case of the transport industries noted
above. However the process of reform was more patchy: