The motorway age (1955–79) - Transport Policy and Planning in Great Britain - page 79

'reshaping' involved the proposed closure of many parts of the railway network and
it is this negative aspect of the report - the so-called 'Beeching cuts' - for which it is
commonly remembered.
After World War II the railways were carrying their all-time maximum of freight
and passenger traffic but the rail system itself was in a poor condition. In the initial
post-war years borrowing for investment was limited but in 1955 - which happened
to be the last year that railways made an operating surplus - the Government agreed
to a Modernisation Plan prepared by the BTC. The Plan included the replacement
of steam by diesel or electric traction and the improvement of track and signalling to
permit higher speeds.
Although the need for modernisation had long been recognised, the Modernisation
Plan itself is generally criticised for being under-researched and over-hastily
implemented. The Plan was long-term in nature but the fact that railway finances
began to deteriorate rapidly after 1955 was unfortunate given the competing claims for
investment in the national road network being made at the same time. When Ernest
Marples was appointed Transport Minister in 1959 he took the decision to scale down
the Modernisation Plan.
In an attempt to solve the worsening financial problem Marples took two major
initiatives. Firstly he dismantled what remained of transport integration and pursued
the principles of competition instead. Under the 1962 Transport Act the BTC was
abolished and in its place separate Boards were set up for railways, canals, docks
and London Transport. The remaining publicly-owned elements of road transport
businesses were placed under a transport holding company. Restrictions on the
railway's ability to operate commercially were removed including for example allowing
the use of surplus land for profitable property development. Much of the debt carried
by BTC as a consequence of nationalisation in 1947 was written off, thus reducing the
interest burden which railway incomes had to cover.
Marples' second initiative was to appoint Dr Beeching and to ask him to identify the
changes which would be necessary to enable the railways to pay their way. Beeching's
proposals were based on a survey of traffic and costs on the railway network. His report
demonstrated much more forcibly than had previously been realised the huge variation
in use and financial performance of different parts of the network and the extent to
which elements such as rural branch lines, 'all stations' passenger services, and local
goods yards had in practice already been superceded by road transport. One third of
the railway's route miles carried only 1% of passenger traffic and 1.5% of freight.
Beeching proposed the closure of about one quarter of the 21,000-mile route
network and the reduction of intermediate stations and goods yards on the remainder.
At the same time he identified the profitable components represented by trainload
freight and by intercity passenger services. In a further report published in 1965 he
proposed concentration of investment on to a 3,000-mile trunk network on which
development of these services would be promoted (MOT 1965).
The closure of small rural branch lines in favour of parallel bus services had been
proceeding slowly for decades in response to the availability of a more convenient
and economical alternative. However the scale and pace of closures began to change
markedly at the beginning of the 1960s. Even where the economic logic appeared
irrefutable, closure proposals generated very considerable local controversy.
British Railways had to go through a statutory procedure to gain ministerial
approval to closing lines or stations. If there were public objections an inquiry would
be held at which cases of hardship would be aired. (BR later learnt to adopt the tactic