The motorway age (1955–79) - Transport Policy and Planning in Great Britain - page 77

Although the substance of the inter-urban road programme did not change greatly,
its presentation altered radically during the short period from 1969 to 1971 to give the
appearance of responding to growing environmental concerns.
Whereas the 1969 Green Paper had said nothing at all on environmental matters,
the 1970 White Paper a year later saw the first appearance of the claim that 'new
roads improve the total environment'. This claim has been continually restated
ever since. By the time of (the) 1971 statement the public was encouraged to
believe that environmental improvements were a prime determinant of the
programme.
(Evans 1992)
Peter Walker's designation as 'Secretary of State for Environment' combining the
former Ministry of Housing and Local Government and the Ministry of Transport was
a further example of this presentational change. The two departmental empires were
bolted together at national and regional levels but genuine integration proved difficult
and the two reverted to separate departments nationally in 1976.
Motorway building reached its peak in 1972 when 400 miles were opened in a single
year. Thereafter the pace slowed considerably due to a combination of environmental
objections, expenditure constraints and revised traffic forecasts. However the falling
completion rates are misleading as an indicator of highway development since
they reflect the progressive impact of the 1970 policy to give greater emphasis to
upgrading existing roads. Such improvements were often planned and constructed in
sections of five miles or so (typically incorporating a bypass of an existing settlement)
even though in time they connected to form a continuous dual-carriageway route
which for practical purposes is indistinguishable from a motorway. Examples are
the A12 (London-Ipswich) and A38 (Birmingham-Derby-M1). Not surprisingly
environmental campaigners viewed this as building 'motorways by stealth'.
During the 1970s the inter-urban road programme became the subject of
increasingly vociferous opposition. This took place against the background of growing
environmental concerns on a global scale highlighted in the influential 1972 Club of
Rome report 'Limits to Growth'. The technique of economic cost-benefit analysis which
the Department relied on to demonstrate the 'justification' for individual schemes
had also received a public drubbing following its use by the Roskill Commission in
evaluating possible sites for a third London airport. This had extended to putting a
monetary value on a Norman parish church threatened with demolition - famously
ridiculed as 'nonsense on stilts' (Hall 1980).
Doubts about long-term growth in the economy also came to the fore in 1973
when, as a result of the Arab-Israeli war, oil prices quadrupled and the availability of
energy suddenly became recognised as a critical policy issue. A new dimension was
added to debates about major roads concerning the 'need' for such schemes at all.
The issue first became prominent at a public inquiry into the proposed M42 south of
Birmingham. A coalition of national environmental groups sought to challenge the
traffic forecasts upon which the scheme was based. The inquiry Inspector refused to
allow the subject to be examined, the argument being that the principle of building the
road was a matter of national policy confirmed by Parliament.
For a time the Government tried to hold the line established at the M42 inquiry and
instructed its inspectors accordingly. Roads objectors, perceiving the inquiry process
to be a farce, resorted to disruptive tactics instead (Tyme 1978) . The administration