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Therefore above
J
i,j
= 0 assumption based on the inequality
|J
i,j
| < |
i
j
|C
i,j
no longer holds for each pair of countries. In particular propensity
p
i,j
become
equal to
J
i,j
in all cases where
i
=0,
j
=0and
i
=
j
=0.
A new distribution of countries results from the collapse of one block. On
the one hand A coalition countries still determine their actual choices between
themselves according to
C
i,j
. On the other hand former B coalition countries are
now determining their choices according to competing links
J
i,j
which did not
automatically agree with former
C
i,j
.
This subset of countries has turned from a random site spin glasses without
frustration into a random bond spin glasses with frustration. The former B
coalition subset has jumped from one stable minimum to a highly degenerated
unstable landscape with many local minima. This property could be related to
the fragmentation process where ethnic minorities and states are shifting rapidly
allegiances back and forth while they were formerly part of a stable structure
just few years ago.
While the B coalition world organization has disappeared, the A coalition
world organization did not change and is still active. The condition
|J
i,j
| <C
i,j
is still valid for A pair of countries with
i
j
= +1. Associated countries thus
maintain a stable relationship and avoid a fragmentation process. This result
supports a posteriori argument against the dissolution of Nato once Warsaw
Pact was disolved. It also favors the viewpoint that former Warsaw Pact countries
should now join Nato.
Above situation could also shed some light on the current European debate.
It would mean European stability is mainly the result of the existence of Euro-
pean structures with economical reality and not the outcome of a new friendship
among former ennemies. These structures produce associated propensities
C
i,j
much stronger than local competing propensities
J
i,j
which are still there. Eu-
ropean stability would indeed result from
C
i,j
> |J
i,j
|
and not from all having
J
i,j
>
0. An eventual setback in the European construction (
i
j
C
i,j
= 0) would
then automatically produce a fragmentation process analogous of what happened
in former Yugoslavia with the activation of ancestral bilateral local conflicts.
6Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a new way to describe alliance forming phenom-
ena among a set of countries. It was shown that within our model the cold war
stabilty was not the result of two opposite alliances but rather the existence of
alliances which neutralize the conflicting interactions within allies. It means also
that having two alliances or just one is qualitatively the same with respect to
stability.
From this viewpoint the strong instabilies which resulted from the Warsow
pact dissolution are given a simple explanation. Simultaneously some hints are
obtained about possible policies to stabilize world nation relationships. Along
this line, the importance of European construction was also underlined. At this
stage, our model remains rather basic. However it opens some new road to ex-
plore and to forecast international policies.
