Monitoring, surveillance and empowerment - Environmental Reform in the Information Age - page 123

instruments in raising environmental awareness and reducing house-
hold energy consumption, in practice several characteristics of these
monitoring schemes prevent this. The technical nature of informa-
tion on the bill, the lack of information on energy use related to spe-
cific domestic practices (bathing, heating, cooking, etc.), deficiencies in
information on the production side of energy and the low frequency
of these bills (usually once a year) give consumers little potential for
countersurveillance or reflexive monitoring strategies. However, there
exist other, more promising, schemes and arrangements.
Obragas, the utility company in the area of the city of Helmond
(the Netherlands), carried out a telemetering experiment in 1997 and
1998. In twenty-nine households, living in newly built, energy-efficient
houses, a special device was installed, which collected data from con-
ventional electricity, water and gas meters and sent the information via
a two-way TV cable to the computer network of Obragas. Consumers
received a weekly personal update on their consumption of water, gas
and electricity on Teletext. Actual consumption levels, aspired savings
and achievements were compared and visualised through smiling, neu-
tral or sad-looking faces. The aim of the experiment was to examine
the possible contribution of regular feedback to consumers on lower-
ing their energy and water consumption. This monitoring arrangement
contributed to a water consumption reduction of 18 percent, a gas con-
sumption decrease by 23 percent and a lower electricity consumption
of 15 percent. According to an evaluation by V ollink and Meertens
( 1999 ), feedback on consumption levels was appreciated. Participants
were mainly interested in comparing current consumption levels with
aspired levels, rather than in the real consumption levels. Much to the
disappointment of the participants, the experiment ended after three
months, as it appeared to be too expensive and technically vulnerable.
The permanent monitoring of household consumption by utilities was
not considered a drawback by the participants (also because consumers
participated voluntarily). The monitoring arrangement, however, did
not allow for any influence of consumers on the infrastructures of con-
sumption: the way that energy and water was produced and the kind
of sources the utility company drew on in producing water and energy.
In that sense, the project stimulated reflexive monitoring possibilities
rather than countersurveillance. For utility companies, such projects
are experiments in binding households to their services through infor-
mation provision and extensive monitoring.