Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust: Basic Ingredients - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 73

Table 2.3 Role of X in the different Kind of Delegation

Weak Delegation X is exploiting E Y (p)

Mild Delegation E X (E Y (p))

Strong Delegation E X (E Y (p))

2.9.1 Trust in Different Forms of Delegation
Although we claim that trust is the mental counter-part of delegation, i.e. that it is a structured
set of mental attitudes characterizing the mind of a delegating agent/trustor, however, there
are important differences, and some independence, between trust and delegation. Trust and
delegation is not the same thing.
Delegation necessarily is an action (at least mental) and the result of a decision, while
trust can be just a potential, a mental attitude. The external, observable behavior of delegating
either consists of the action of provoking the desired behavior, of convincing and negotiating,
of charging and empowering, or just consists of the action of doing nothing (omission) waiting
for and exploiting the behavior of the other. Indeed, we will use trust and reliance only to
denote the mental state preparing and underlying delegation ( trust will be both: the small
nucleus and the whole). 48
There may be trust without delegation : either the level of trust is not sufficient to delegate;
or the level of trust would be sufficient but there are other reasons preventing delegation (for
example prohibitions); or trust is just potential, a predisposition: 'X will, would, might rely on
Y, if/when

', but it is not (yet) the case. So, trust is normally necessary for delegation, but it
is not sufficient : delegation requires a richer decision.
There may be delegation (or better just 'counting on') without trust : these are exceptional
cases in which either the delegating agent is not free (coercive delegation 49 ) or she has
no information and no alternative to delegating, so that she must just make a trial (blind
delegation). So, all trust decisions and acts imply an act of delegation, but not every act of
delegation is an act of trust.
Moreover, the decision to delegate has no degrees: either X delegates or X does not delegate.
Indeed trust has degrees: X trusts Y more or less relatively to

...

α . And there is a threshold under

which trust is not enough for delegating.

Trust in Weak Delegation

While considering the possible temporal gap between the decision to trust and the delegation
we have to consider some other interesting mental elements. (The temporal gap ranges between
0 and

∞ ∞

means
that delegation remains just a potential action). In particular we have in all the cases (weak,
mild and strong delegation) X 's intention-that Y will achieve the task (Grosz and Kraus, 1996).
In every case this intention is composed through different intentions.

; 0 means that we have delegation at the same time as the decision to trust ;

48 In our previous works we used “reliance” as a synonym of “delegation”, denoting the action of relying on; here
we decide to use “reliance” for the (part of the) mental state, and only “delegation” for the action of relying and
trusting.
49 Consider the example of the drunk driver, in note 40.