Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust: Basic Ingredients - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 68

Thus, to be precise we can say that:
With the decision to trust Y (in the sense of relying on Y), X makes herself
both more dependent and more vulnerable , and is more exposed to risks and
harms by Y.
2.8.1 'Risk' Definition and Ontology
What is risk? We accept the traditional view that risks for X are possible dangers impinging
on X in a given context or scenario. More precisely the 'risk' is the estimated gravity/entity
of the harm multiplied for its likelihood: the greater the possible harm the greater the risk; the
greater the likelihood the greater the risk. 44
However, we believe that this characterization is not enough and that it is important for the
theory of trust (and for the theory of intentional action) to have a good ontology of risks ,
introducing several additional distinctions.
Any intentional action, any decision exposes, makes us vulnerable , to some 'risk'. Any act
of trust, of relying on actions of others, exposes us to risks just for this general principle. The
additional feature in trust is that the incurred risks come from the others : depends on their
possible misbehavior; just because one has decided to depend on them. The decision to trust is
the decision to not fully protect ourselves from possible dangers from Y , of exposing ourselves
to possible dangers from Y , at least as for the disappointment of our positive expectation,
the failure of the 'delegated' action, but possibly also the other risks resulting from our non
diffident attitude, good faith, non protection. But other distinctions are needed.
First of all, it is crucial to distinguish between 'objective' risks (the risks that X incurs
following the point of view of an external ideal observer) from the 'subjective' , perceived
risks. Second, it is important to build on Luhman's intuition about the useful distinction
between the dangers to which one is exposed independently from his decisions and actions,
and those to which one is exposed as a consequence of his own decision and action. He
proposes to call 'risks' only the second ones: the risks we 'take'. 45
Given a certain point of choice in time, with different possible 'futures', different paths,
there are risks which are only in one path and not on the others; risks which are in all possible
future worlds 46 . When we choose to go in one direction or in another (by doing or not doing
something) we 'take' those specific risks. But in a given path (or on all paths) there might
be risks which do not depend at all on us and our choices. For example, if our planet would
collapse under the tremendous impact of an asteroid (and this 'risk' is in fact there) this will
44 Actually the two 'components' are not fully independent - from a psychological point of view. One dimension
can affect the other: the perceived 'value' of the threatened goal or of the pursued goal can be modified by its chance
(also, for example, for additional activated goals, like avoiding or searching for excitement, hazard); while the same
estimated probability can be perceived/valued in different ways depending on the importance of goal.
45 Although, as we will show, it is better to restrict the notion of “taken” risks, and of “taking risks” to a subset of
this.
46 This is not exactly the same distinction. There might be risks present on every path which are nevertheless
dependent on the fact that we have 'chosen' to go in that direction; for example, the risk “to be responsible” for our
action/choice and for some possible bad consequence.