Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust: Basic Ingredients - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 64

In natural language, I can 'trust' even the rope or the rock, but this is more than just 'relying
on' it or deciding to grasp it.
Trust is (conscious and free, deliberated) reliance based on a judgment, on an evaluation
of Y's virtues, and some explicit or entailed prediction/expectation : 'How could you trust that
rock? It was clearly so friable!' 'No, I have tested it before; I evaluated it and I was convinced
that it would have supported me!'

What is Reliance?

α

As showed in Section 1.3, in any (intentional, external) action there is one part of the causal

process triggered by the action and necessary for producing the result/goal of the action and
defining it which is beyond the direct executive control of the Agent ( Ag )of

α . In performing

α , Ag is making reliance on these processes and this is true in both cases:

if Ag knows this, models this in his mind, and expects this;
if Ag doesn't understand the process, is not aware of it, or at least doesn't explicitly represent
it in his plan (although he might be able to do so).

As we said (Section 1.3), in the first case reliance becomes delegation . 'Delegation' would
be the subjective and chosen reliance . Counting upon: conceiving in Ag s individual mind a
multi-agent plan including (planning, expecting) the action of another autonomous agent. In
the second case we have pure reliance.
In Delegation (at least) one part of the delegator's subjective plan for successfully accom-
plishing the intentional act and achieving its goal, is 'allocated' to another agent either

natural (like the sun when bronzing; or a coffee to feel awake) or social (like a waiter to bring
food).
Let us clarify the concept: Ag is making reliance upon Y/P (where Y is another agent and
P is a process) when: there are actions (or inactions) in Ag's plan which are based on/rely
upon Y/P, which depend on it for their efficacy (in other words: that process P due to Agent
Y creates some conditions for the performance or for the efficacy of those actions), and Ag
decides to perform those actions or directly performs them, Ag invests on Y/P (costs), Ag risks,
Ag is relying on the fact that P will actually happen .
P (due to Y ) is a necessary process/condition for the achievement of Ag s goal, but it is
not sufficient: Ag has to do (or abstain from doing) something, and thus Ag has to decide
something: whether counting on Y/P or not, whether investing on it; Ag has to take her own
decision of exploiting it or not.
'Delegation' requires some trust, and trust as free decision and action is about delega-
tion. This also means that trust implies that X has not complete power and control over
the agent/process Y, he is relying and counting upon . Trust is a case of limited power, of
'dependence'.
When Y is an autonomous cognitive agent this perceived degree of freedom and autonomy
consists in its 'choice': Y can decide to do or not to do the expected action. With this kind
of agent (social trust) we in fact trust Y for deciding, being willing, to do - against possible
conflicting goals at the very moment and in the circumstance of the performance - what Y
'has to' do (for us); we trust (in) Y 's motivation, decision, and intention.

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