Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust: Basic Ingredients - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 59

Potential Goal G 0 : Goal X (g) = g X with g X ⊆ p

Potential Expectation B 1 : Bel X (Can Y ( α ,p))

(Competence)

G 1 : Will X (Can Y ( α ,p))

Potential Expectation B 2 : Bel X (<WillDo Y ( α )>p)

(Disposition)

G 2 : Will X (<WillDo Y ( α )>p)

Core Trust

(Dependence)

B 3 : Bel X Dependence XY ( α ,p)

G 3 : Goal X (Not(<WillDo X ( α )>p))

G 4 : Goal X (<WillDo Y ( α )>p)

Reliance

TRUST

Figure 2.6 Mental State of the Decision to Trust

be true (thanks to Y in this case). This is the 'trust that' g X (case in which g X = p). That is, X 's

trust in Y about task τ , for goal that p , implies also some trust that p will be realized (thanks

to Y ). 33
When X decides to trust, X has also the new goal that Y performs

in
her plan (delegation) (for more on this decision see Chapter 3). In other words, on the basis of
those beliefs about Y , X 'leans against', 'counts on', 'depends upon', 'relies on'; X practically
'trusts' Y . Where, notice, 'to trust' does not only mean those basic beliefs (the core: see Fig-
ure 2.4) but also the decision (the broad mental state) and the act of delegating.
To be more explicit: on the basis of those beliefs about Y, X decides of not renouncing to g X ,
not personally bringing it about, not searching for alternatives to Y, and to pursue g X through
Y. This decision is the second crucial component of the mental state of trust: let us call this
part reliance trust (we called the first part core trust ) and the whole picture mental state of
trust and the delegation behavior.
Also, once more using Meyer, van Linder, van der Hoek et al. 's logics ((Meyer, 1992),
(van Linder, 1996)), we can summarize and simplify the mental ingredients of trust as in
Figure 2.6.
Of course, there is a coherence relation between these two aspects of trust (core and reliance):
the decision of betting and wagering on Y is grounded on and justified by these beliefs. More
than this: the degree or strength (see Chapter 3) of trust must be sufficient to decide to rely
and bet on Y ((Marsh, 1994), (Snijders, 1996)). The trustful beliefs about Y (core) are the
presuppositions of the act of trusting Y .

α , and X relies on Y 's α

33 Is Section 2.6.1 we will be more precise and complete on the relationships between “Trust that” and “Trust in”.