Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust: Basic Ingredients - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 56

-form is always present, at least implicitly; also when there
is the richer and more specific attitude of

Inasense-aswehavesaid- α

β -form . In fact, when applied to the same set of goals

( β -form ) implies ( α -form ):

if Y will be useful or even helpful for the achievement of the goal g X , he is not a
problem, a threat for the goal g X .

To favor goal g X implies to not harm goal g X , since the achievement of goal g X implies the
non frustration of goal g X . However, this implication does not mean that when X trusts Y (as
capable and responsible for certain goals) X is always and fully relaxed and has nothing to
worry from Y . In fact: what about other possible goals of X ?
Except when applied to the same sub-set of goals or when 'generalized' (i.e., applied to
all X 's possible goals) -form . If trust is relative to a

sub-set of X 's goals, it is perfectly possible that X trusts Y (in the sense of

β -form in fact doesn't necessary imply α

-form ) for certain
goals, but X could worry about her other goals; or, vice versa, that X trusts Y (in the sense of
α

β

-form ) which is unwarlike, not threatening, but X cannot trust (in the sense of β -form )him

β α

as able and helpful towards some goal of hers. Thus, -form and -form don't necessarily

α

co-occur, except for the same subset of goals. To be true the -form potentially entails the

β

-form since it is the presupposition for a possible reliance.

2.5 Weakening the Belief-Base: Implicit Beliefs, Acceptances,
and Trust by-Default
To make things simpler, we assume in our model that trust is composed by and based on
'beliefs'. However, this is an antonomasia : trust is based on doxastic attitudes : beliefs, knowl-
edge, but also just acceptances (in our vocabulary: assumptions ). Beliefs are assumed to be
true in the world; to match with the (current, future, previous) world, if/when tested; or at least
they are produced with this function and perspective. But we also have different and weaker
doxastic attitudes on mental representations; or better different functions and uses of them.
For example, a very important function for the theory of purposive behavior (and for the
theory of trust) is the use of doxastic representations as conditions for actions and decisions. In
order to decide to act and to act (and for choosing an action) some conditions must be true, or
better: they must be assumed (but not necessarily verified or proved). These are assumptions .
We can use beliefs as assumptions; but they can also be unreal beliefs.
We can base our actions or reasoning on simple or mere 'assumptions' (non-belief assump-
tions), which have not been tested or are not destined to be tested. They are just - implicitly
and automatically or explicitly - 'given for granted' or used 'as if'. Only the success of the
practical action based on them, will provide an unconscious and indirect feedback about their
'truth'; will 'confirm' and indirectly 'verify' them. It is important to distinguish between
mere-assumptions and beliefs because one cannot decide to believe something while one can
decide to assume something (Cohen, 1992) (Engel, 1998).
This is also very relevant for trust because sometimes we trust Y not on the basis of real -
more or less certain - beliefs (based on experience or on inference), but just assuming some-
thing about Y , and acting 'as if'. It is even possible to explicitly 'decide' to trust Y . We do not
have sufficient evidence; current evidence does not provide us with enough certainty ('degree
of trust') for trusting Y , but we can overcome this situation not by waiting or searching for