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The harder the expected harm and the more sure the expectation (i.e. the more serious the
subjective threat) the more intense the 'relief'.
More precisely: the higher the worry, the threat, and the stronger the relief. The worry is
already a function of the value of the harm and its certainty.
Analogously, joy seems to be more intense depending on the value of the goal, but also on
how unexpected it is.
A more systematic analysis should distinguish between different kinds of surprise (based
on different monitoring activities and on explicit versus implicit beliefs), and different kinds
of disappointment and relief due to the distinction between 'maintenance' situations and
'change/achievement' situations.
More precisely (making the value of the goal constant) the case of loss is usually worse
than simple non-achievement. This is coherent with the theory of psychic suffering (Miceli
and Castelfranchi, 1997) that claims that pain is greater when there is not only frustration
but disappointment (that is a previous Exp ), and when there is 'loss', not just 'missed gains',
that is when the frustrated goal is a maintenance goal not an achievement goal. However, the
presence of Exp makes this even more complicated.
2.3.6 Trust is not Reducible to a Positive Expectation
Is trust reducible to a positive expectation? For example, to the estimated subjective probability
of a favorable event? (as in many celebrated definitions). Trust as belief-structure is not just
an 'expectation' (positive/favorable).
Let us put aside the fact that trust (at least implicitly) is trust in an agent; it is an expectation
grounded on an 'internal attribution'. Even not considering 'trust that Y will
.' or 'trust
in Y , but just 'trust that p (for example, 'I trust that tomorrow it will be sunny') there is
something more than a simple positive expectation. X is not only positively predicting, but
is 'counting on', that p is actively concerned; X has something to do or to achieve, such that
p is a useful condition for that . Moreover, such an expectation is rather sure: the perceived
favorable chances are greater than the adverse ones, or the uncertainty (the plausible cases)
is assumed as favorable. This is one of the differences between trust and hope ; the difference
between 'I trust that tomorrow will be sunny' and 'I hope that tomorrow will be sunny'. In the
second one, I'm less certain, and just 'would like so'; in the first one, I am more sure about
this, and that is why I (am ready to) count on this.
In fact, even non-social trust cannot be simply reduced to a favorable prediction. This is
even clearer for the strict notion of 'social trust' ( 'genuine' trust ) (Section 2.11): which is
based on the expectation of adoption , not just on the prediction of a favorable behavior of Y .
...
2.4 'No Danger': Negative or Passive or Defensive Trust
As we said, in addition to Competence and Willingness , there is a third dimension in evaluating
the trustworthiness of Y : Y should be perceived as not threatening, as harmless .
Either Y is benevolent towards X (for similarity, co-interest, sympathy, friendship, etc.), or
there are strong internal (moral) or external (vigilance, sanctions) reasons for not harming
X . This very important dimension appears to be missing in the definitions considered by
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