Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust: Basic Ingredients - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 49

Either X is actively monitoring what is happening and comparing the incoming information
(for example perception) to the internal mental representation; or X is doing this cyclically
and regularly; or X will in any case at the moment of the future event or state compare what
happens with her prediction (epistemic actions). Because in any case she has the goal to know
whether the world actually is as anticipated, and if the prediction was correct. Schematically: 24

( Bel X t ( Will-be-True t ( Goal X period ( t , t ) ( Expectation X p ) = > p )) ∧

( KnowWhether X ( pORNot p ) t )) where t ≥ t > t .

X has the expectation p if X believes (at the time t ) that p will be true (at the time t ) and
has the goal (for the period t -t ) to know if p is true. This really is 'expecting' and the true
'expectation'.

2.3.2 Content Goals
The epistemic/monitoring goal described above (to know if p will be true) is combined with
Goal that p : the agent's need, desire, or 'intention that' the world should realize. This is really
why and in which sense X is 'concerned' and not indifferent, and also why she is monitoring
the world. She is an agent with interests, desires, needs, objectives on the world, not just a
predictor. This is also why computers, that already make predictions, do not have expectations.
When the agent has a goal opposite to her prediction, she has a 'negative expectation'; when
the agent has a goal equal to her prediction she has a 'positive expectation' (see Section 2.3.5). 25
In sum, expectations ( Exp ) are axiological anticipatory mental representations, endowed
with Valence : they are positive or negative or ambivalent or neutral; but in any case they are
evaluated against some concern, drive, motive, goal of the agent .In Exp we have to distinguish
two components:

On the one hand, there is a mental anticipatory representation, the belief about a future state
or event, the 'mental anticipation' of the fact, what we might also call the pre-vision (to
for-see).

The format of this belief or pre-vision can be either propositional or imagery (or mental
model of); this does not matter. Here, the function alone is pertinent.

On the other hand, as we have just argued, there is a co-referent goal (wish, desire, intention,
or any other motivational explicit representation).

24 We will not use here a logical formalization; we will just use a self-explanatory and synthetic notation, useful
for a schematic characterization of different combinations of beliefs and goals.
25 To be true a goal equal to the prediction in expectation is always there, although frequently quite weak and
secondary relative to the main concern. In fact, when X predicts p and monitors the world to know whether it is
actually p , she also has the goal that p , just in order to not disconfirm her prediction, and to confirm she is a good
predictor, to feel that the world is predictable and have a sense of 'control'. (See Section 7.1.2). We are referring to
predictability , that is, the cognitive component of self-efficacy: the need to anticipate future events and the consequent
need to find such an anticipation validated by facts. This need for prediction is functional in humans in order to avoid
anxiety, disorientation and distress. (Cooper and Fazio, 1984:17) have experimentally proved that people act in order
to find their forecasts (predictions) validated by facts and feel distressed by invalidation.