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Competence
Competence is the set of qualities that makes
Y able
for
;
Y
's internal powers: skills, know
how, expertise, knowledge, self-esteem and self-confidence,
16
and so on. When
X
trusts
Y
for
τ
τ
, she ascribes to
Y
some competence.
Competence - as we claimed - cannot be put aside (like in many models and definitions;
see Chapter 1) and cannot be separated from trust in
Y
's reliability.
First of all, it is an important issue in rejecting the fully normative foundation of trust -
pursued by many authors (like (Elster, 1979); (Hertzberg, 1988); (Jones, 2002)), which cannot
be extended in a simple way
Y
's skills and competences.
17
Moreover, competente and reliability are not fully independent dimensions. Even
Y
's coop-
erative (
adoptive
) attitude towards
X
may require some skill and competence. For example,
Y
may be more or less competent and able in
understanding X
's needs or in comprehending
X
's
interests (even beyond
X
's own understanding); it is not just a matter of 'concern' or of good
will. For example,
Y
's competence, ability, expertise, can be the basis for his self-confidence
and sense of mastering, and this can be crucial in
Y
's willingness and intention to adopt
X
's
goal, in
Y
's persistence in this intention, which are crucial aspects of
Y
's 'reliability'. And so on.
Predictability and Willingness
The second fundamental dimension is not about
Y
's potential and abstract capability of doing
τ
, but about his actual behavior; the fact that
Y
is reliable, predictable, one can count on him;
he not only
is able to do
,but
will actually do
the needed action.
Applied to a cognitive
Y
, this means that
Y
is
willing
(really has the intention to do
α
for
g
X
)
and
persistent
(Castelfranchi and Falcone, 1998a), (Falcone and Castelfranchi, 2001b). Also,
in this case we have to consider on the one hand, the abstract predictability and willingness
of
Y
not related to other elements and, on the other hand, its relevant correlations with the
specific tasks and the different trustors.
These (
Competence and Willingness
) are the prototypical components of trust as an attitude
towards
Y
. They will be enriched and supported by other beliefs depending on different kinds
of delegation and different kinds of agents; however, they are the real cognitive kernel of trust.
As we will see later, even the goal can be varied (in negative expectation and in aversive forms
of 'trust'), but not these beliefs.
Those (evaluative) beliefs are not enough; other important beliefs are necessary, especially
for moving towards the decision to trust, and the intention and action of trusting.
Using Meyer, van Linder, van der Hoek
et al.
's logics ((Meyer, 1992), (van Linder, 1996)),
and introducing some 'ad hoc' predicate (like WillDo)
18
we can summarize and simplify the
mental ingredients of trust as follows:
16
In rational beings (which decide to act on the basis of what they believe about the possibility of achieving the
goal) there is a strange paradox of power: It is not enough 'to be able to'; in order to really be able, having the power
of, the agent must also believe (be aware) of having the 'power of', otherwise they will renounce, they will nor exploit
their skills or resources. (Castelfranchi, 2003)
17
Although this can be made simpler precisely by our theory of 'standards' as the needed, expected, and thus
'prescribed' qualities that a given instance of class O must possess in order to be a good or regular O. However, in
any case, one has to distinguish 'normative' from 'moral'.
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This is a simplification. Before being a belief that “
Y
will do” this is a belief about a potential delegation: “
Y
(in
case) would do” “
Y
would be able and willing to
...
”, “
X
might rely on
Y
”. (See Section 2.3.2).
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