Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust: Basic Ingredients - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 40

Under all these crucial aspects a motivational component is presupposed in X , and makes
clear 'expectations', 'evaluations', 'concern' and 'interest', 'affects', etc.
Actually, when we examine all these phenomena, we explain them in terms of important
motives, needs, projects, desires, preferences, objectives, and so on, for the realization of which
the agent is evaluating other agents and the possibility to rely on (exploit) them. The abstract
category we use for all these motivational terms and categories is 'goal'. However, it must be
very clear what a 'Goal' is in cognitive psychology, on the basis of the cybernetic definition
and of the following psychological models.
'Goal': What is This?
'Goal' is a perfect term but not in the most superficial and typical English use, where it usually
refers to a pursued external objective to be actively reached ; some step in my active plan,
driving my action. 14
The right general notion of 'goal' and of 'goal-directed or driven behavior' has been
provided by cybernetics and control-theory many years ago (Rosenbleuth Wiener in 'Purposive
Systems'), and has been imported in psychology and Cognitive Science in the 1960s with the
TOTE model by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960).
A 'Goal' is the mental representation that 'evaluates' the world (we evaluate the world
against it); if the world does not match with, we can be activated for changing the world and
realize that state; but, before this, we examine it to see if it is the case or not: is the goal
self-realizing or impossible? Or: is it up to us to realize it? Do we have the appropriate actions
for this? Are there the necessary conditions for acting successfully? Are there more important
goals to be preferred? After all these tests the Goal may become our pursued objective. But, it
already is a 'Goal' in all the other conditions and previous steps.
It is a 'Goal' even before we believe or know that it is realized or not; before we decide
that it depends on us to (attempt to) realize it; that we can and should act. Then it can become
an 'intention' (if chosen, if I have a plan for it, if I'm ready to; if I have decided to act for
realizing it) and be 'pursued' (Castelfranchi and Paglieri, 2007).
In sum, a Goal is a Goal even before or without being pursued: happiness is due to goal-
realization and sufferance is due to goal frustration, but not necessarily to our active successes
or failures: we are crying because our mother has died, or happy because, without asking,
doing or expecting anything, she gave us a kiss.
Given this - not vague, common sense, or reductive - notion, we can make clear that:
14 Consider for example that one of Andrew Jones' central objections to our model of trust is precisely due to such
a peculiar use of the notion of “goal” (Jones, 2002): “While it is true to say that a goal-component of this sort is
often present, this is by no means always so. For example, x might trust y to pay his (y's) taxes ... , even though it
is not a goal of x that y pays . Also, x might trust y when y asserts that p, even though x does not have it as a goal to
find out whether p is the case.” (p. 229). On the contrary, the general notion of “Goal” precisely covers also those
cases. Of course X has the goal that the other guys pay their taxes! Only in this sense he “ trusts them as for paying their
taxes”. Obviously, this does not mean that X is personally doing something in order to produce this result in the world;
she is not actively pursuing that goal. But not all our goals are or must be personally pursued. X is wishing, desiring,
prescribing, expecting, ... . that the others will pay taxes. That's why, just in case, she will be not just surprised but
frustrated and upset, and will blame them, and so on. Analogously, “ x does not have it as a goal to find out whether
pisthecase” , sure! However, X has the goal (wish, prescription, and so on) that Y says the truth; precisely in this
sense “ X .. trusts Y when Y asserts that p”.