Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust: Basic Ingredients - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 38

2.2.2 The 'Motivational' Side of Trust
In our opinion, part of the core of trust is the 'prediction' component: a belief about a future
event or state. However, this core element although necessary is not sufficient in our view (as
for example claimed by A. Jones (A. Jones, 2006)).
Many definitions in the literature (Chapter 1) (even those mentioned by Jones) either
explicitly or implicitly also contain the idea that trust is relative to some reliance upon, to
some welfare and interest. In our analysis this means that the trustor has some 'goal', not only
beliefs. Some author contexts precisely this point, that for us is fundamental: the other core
(motivational).
Is Trust Reducible to a (Grounded) Belief, a Regularity-Based Prediction?
Certainly, one can establish a conventional, technical meaning of 'trust' far from its natural
language meaning and psycho-sociological use; but in our view this is not particularly useful.
It would be more heuristic to abstract from common-sense meaning and to enlighten and
identify (and formalize) the basic, necessary and sufficient conceptual constituent (useful for
a rich and explanatory theory of the psycho-social phenomena). In this case we think that one
cannot miss the fact that when X trusts someone or something for something X is concerned,
is involved; X cannot be neutral and indifferent about what will happen. In other words, X
has not simply a prediction, but a full 'expectation'. In our analysis an 'expectation' is more
than a simple forecast or belief about the future (based on some experience, law, regularity,
or whatever). Trust in our model is composed of 'expectations' about Y , his behavior, and
a desired result. A mere 'regularity' does not produce 'trust' (it can even produce 'fear').
Even to produce Luhman's 'confidence' (just based on regularities without choice) something
more is necessary. In fact, confidence (which in fact is just a simpler form of trust) is a
positive, pleasant feeling; it implies some implicit or explicit goal and its realization (for
example to avoid stress, surprise, problems, anxiety). When apparently a mere prediction
or perceived regularity determines a feeling or attitude of trust or confidence it is because
X not only believes but desires that the world goes in such a regular, predictable way: see
the need for 'predictability' ((Bandura, 1986) our theory of expectations, etc.). The issue is
how predictions become prescriptions (Miceli and Castelfranchi, 2002) and (Castelfranchi
et al. , 2003).
When we set up or activate protection or surveillance systems, precisely because we know
that there is a high probability of rapine (ex. banks) or of aggressions, we do not have 'trust'
they will rapinate or aggress us! And when we institute the firemen organization we 'expect'
but we do not 'trust' that there will be fires! We 'trust' that firemen will be able to put out the
fire (as desired!).
There are computer making/producing weather forecasts, but they do not have 'expectations'
about the weather (although they could check whether the prediction were correct and fulfilled,
in order to learn and adjust); even less likely do they have 'trust' about a sunny day (or rainy!).
Thus a mere belief (prediction) (even regularity based) is not enough. Nor it is 'necessary'.
In fact there can be trust and bet/reliance on non-regular, exceptional events (perhaps an
'irrational' trust, but trust; 'This time it will be different! I'm sure, I feel so: it cannot happen
again!' ).