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However, this is just a very peculiar case, and it is mistaken to take it as prototypical for
founding the notion and the theory of 'trust' and of 'cooperation'. In general, a symmetric and
reciprocal view of trust is unprincipled. In contrast, we can (and should) distinguish between
two basic constituents and moves of pro-social relations :
On the one side, goal-adoption , i.e. the disposition (and eventually the decision) of doing
something for the other, in order to favor him.
On the other side, delegation , i.e. the disposition (and eventually the decision) to count on
the other, to delegate to him the realization of our goals and welfare (Castelfranchi and
Falcone, 1998).
It is important to realize that this basic pro-social structure, which constitutes the nucleus
of cooperation, exchange, and many other social relations, is bilateral but not symmetrical. In
other words, pro-social bilateral relations do not start with reciprocation (which would entail
some symmetry), nor with any form of exchange. The basic structure is instead composed
by a social disposition and act of counting on the other and being dependent on him, thus
expecting adoption from him (i.e. trust ); this pro-social attitude will hopefully be matched by
a disposition and an act of doing something for the other, of goal-adoption (see on this point
Spinoza's notion of benevolence ). 12
Notice that the anti-social corresponding bilateral structure is composed of hostility , i.e. the
disposition not to help or to harm, paired with distrust and diffidence from the other actor.
As this analysis should have made clear, benevolence and trust are not at all the same move
or disposition (although both are pro-social and often combine together); they belong to and
characterize two different although complementary actors and roles. Benevolence and trust
are complementary and closely related, but they are also in part independent: they can occur
without each other and can just be 'unilateral'. X can rely on Y , and trust him, without Y
being benevolent towards X . Not only in the sense that X 's expectation is wrong and he will
be disappointed by Y ; but in the sense that X can successfully rely on Y and exploit Y 's 'help'
without any awareness or adoption by Y . On the other hand, Y can unilaterally adopt X 's goals
without any expectation from X , and even any awareness of such a help.
Moreover, both trust and benevolence do not necessarily involve symmetric relations be-
tween agents. It is possible to have cases of asymmetric trust 13 where only X trusts Y , while Y
does not trust X (although he knows that X trusts him and X knows that Y does not trust her).
And this holds both for trust about a specific kind of service or performance, as well as for
generalized trust.
In addition, trust does not presuppose any equality among the agents , since there can be
asymmetric power relationships between the trustor and the trustee: X can have much more
power over Y , than Y over X (like it happens between parents and children). Analogously,
goal-adoption can be fully asymmetrical, whenever X does something for Y , but not vice versa.
When there is a bilateral, symmetrical, and possibly reciprocal goal-adoption (i.e. the
contribution of X to Y 's interests is also due to the help of Y towards the realization of X 's goals,
12 On the contrary, 'justice' either is the rule of providing adoption or (if interpreted as 'fairness') it is also the rule
of exchange, and thus it presupposes some reciprocity.
13 This is for example in contrast with May Tuomela's account of Trust (Tuomela, 2003).
 
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