On the Trustee’s Side: Trust As Relational Capital - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 293

G'

DoT j3

G
'

DoT j4
DoT j5

DoT ji

G''

DoT 1i

G''

G'''

DoT 2i

G'''

G

i

Figure 10.10 Example in which Ag i might increase his own trust capital reducing in some way Ag j 's
trust in his competitors ( Ag 3 , Ag 4 , Ag 5 )

iv) Alternatively, Ag i could work to reduce the believed (by Ag j ) value of the ability of
each of the possible competitors of Ag i (in a number of p kj ) on that specific task

τ k , See

Figure 10.10: he has to work SPN T (Ag j ,g jk ) .

Let us now consider how willingness beliefs can be manipulated. In order to do so, consider
the particular strategy that needs to be performed to gain the other's good attitude through
gifts (Cialdini, 1990). It is true that the expected reaction will be of reciprocation, but this is
not enough. While giving a gift Ag i knows that Ag j will be more inclined to reciprocate, but
Ag i also knows that his action can be interpreted as a sign of the good will he has: since he has
given something without being asked, Ag j is driven to believe that Ag i will not cheat on her.
Then, the real strategy can be played on trust, sometimes totally and sometimes only partially -
this will basically depend on the specific roles of agents involved.
Again in formal terms, we can say that Ag i has to work to increase his DoW i as believed by
Ag j ( Bel j ( DoA i )).
Alternatively, it could work to reduce the believed (by Ag j ) value of willingness of each of the
possible competitors of Ag i (in number of p kj ) on that specific task τ k , See again Figure 10.10.