The Glue of Society - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 272

and a feeling, it cannot really be 'prescribed', since is not really 'voluntary'. Only the act,
the intention can paradoxically be 'prescribed': 'Trust him! Rely on him!'; but not the real
background disposition. 7
However, moral (and religious) norms can impinge even on mere mental dispositions ('Do
not desire

' 'Do not have this kind of thought'); thus there might be, and in fact it seems
that there is, a social-moral norm about reciprocating trust: 'Since if X trusted you, you have
to trust X '. To trust somebody seems to be a form of 'gentle' disposition or act, and it seems
that we have to respond to a gentle act with a gentle act, to a smile with a smile.
There is a clear psychosocial phenomenon of trust propagation such that trust creates trust
while diffidence creates hostility. If X trusts Y , this tends to elicit not only a 'benevolent' but
also a 'trustful' attitude in Y towards X . However, we do not believe that it is mainly due to
such a possible moral norm. We believe that it is mainly due to:

...

The fact that while trusting Y , X makes himself dependent and vulnerable to Y , more exposed,
and thus less dangerous, harmless.
The fact that while trusting Y , X shows positive evaluations, esteem, thus a good disposition
towards Y , which can be a good basis and a prognostic sign for 'benevolence' towards Y , that
is, for adoption; (it is more probable that we help somebody who we perceive as competent
and benevolent, although we do not currently intend to exchange with them).
The fact that while trusting Y , X may even rely on common values, on sympathy (common
feelings), on a sense of common membership, etc. and this makes him in his turn reliable,
safe.

Nevertheless, we believe that such a norm of responding to trust with trust, exists. It is not
responsible for eliciting trust in response to trust, but it is important for other functions. It is
used for moral evaluation , and is responsible for blame, shame, etc.

9.7 Trust: The Catalyst of Institutions
As we said, trust is crucial for the whole of social life (exchange, cooperation, communication,
rules of conflict, etc.), however it is in particular fundamental (or better, foundational) for the
'institution' (Searle, 1995).
Together with:

actors' recognition and assumption (acceptance) of the institutional act and effect, and with
actors' 'as if' behavior (conforming to the assumption) (Tummolini, 2006), trust is the
necessary ground on which our 'institutions' base themselves, their 'count-as' nature.

Actually, it is trust (and behavioral conformity) that 'institute' them and give them (make
'real') their artificial effects.
In fact, the social 'representation', the collective mise en scene (Goffman, 1959), is strictly
based on compliance and complicity, on collusion; that is, on the (prescribed) assumption that

7 In those extreme cases trust as disposition wouldn't be enough for the intention, but we add independent, external,
additional reasons which forces us to 'trust' in the sense of deciding to rely on Y.