The Glue of Society - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 270

a given conforming behavior in self-regulated systems, and the translation of this into some
proximate mechanism affecting or producing the behavior of the system, conforming to
that rule and thus 'regular'. It is not one and the same thing.
In particular it is quite different:
saying that I trust and rely on a given predicted behavior ( based on some perceived rule or
regularity, or on some norm and conformity to it);
saying that I trust the prediction; or that I trust the norm;
saying that I trust the behavior in force of the explicit norm.
Is my prediction based-on such (perceived) regularity, on such a rule; or is that behavior
based on that rule (affecting the mind of Y )? It is not at all the same thing.
2) However, even more important than this, one should be careful to preserve the very fun-
damental distinction made by Tommaso between : 'Id quod intelligitur' and 'Id quo intel-
ligitur ': what (O) I'm thinking about, categorizing, recognizing, understanding, knowing,
vs. what I'm using for thinking about O, for representing O in my mind (or externally):
the representation, the scheme. 5 I'm not thinking the representation; I'm thinking about my
object of knowledge through the representation . 6
This clear distinction is fundamental for cognitive sciences (and semiotics).
Analogously, thanks to and through a given (implicit or explicit) 'rule' and learned regularity,
I think that something p will happen (in the future). I do not believe - in the same way and
sense - the rule (or in the rule). I believe with/through/ thanks to the rule ('Id quo'), not the
rule ('Id quod').
If, for example, I believe that - since it starts raining - the ground will become wet, or if I
believe that in springtime that tree in my garden will produce flowers (and I trust in this), I do
not believe that the tree (or the rain) will follow/respect the norm. Not only do I not have some
animistic, and 'intentional stance', but even less I believe that 'the rule will be respected'. I
just use the rule (for inferring); its systematic use is a procedural, implicit assumption that it
is true (reliable) and that 'it will be respected', but not an explicit belief and judgment, like
my expectation about p .
If I strongly hope and even trust that she will accept my courtship this night, after my
flowers, dinner, intimate atmosphere, wine, etc. as usual from my previous experiences, I do
not 'trust' (believe) that 'she will respect the rule', or that 'the rule will be respected'.
Logicians seem rather insensible to this fundamental distinction between explicitly repre-
sented goals or beliefs, and merely procedural implementations. For example, one should not
use the same predicate (Bel x p) to represent the status/use/role of 'being believed' of p in X 's
mind, and the object 'belief'; object of various propositional attitudes: (Goal Y (Bel X p)), (Bel
5 Quaestio 85; Prooemium Deinde considerandum est de modo et ordine intelligendi. Et circa hoc quaeruntur octo.
Primo, utrum intellectus noster intelligat abstrahendo species a phantasmatibus. Secundo, utrum species intelligibiles
abstractae a phantasmatibus, se habeant ad intellectum nostrum ut quod intelligitur, vel sicut id quo intelligitur
(Thomas de Aquino, Summa Theologiae, I a q. 84-89)
6 Except I go to a meta-level, and take the representation itself (the 'significant') as my object of reflection.