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third party more. We can have a group, an authority able to issue norms (defending rights
and creating obligations), to control violation, to punish violators. Of course this authority or
reference group must be shared and acknowledged, and as we said trusted by both
X
and
Y
.
Thus we have got an additional problem of trust. However, now
Y
has additional reasons for
keeping his commitment, and
X
's degree of trust is higher.
Notice that all these additional beliefs about
Y
are specific kinds or facets of trust in
Y
:
X
trusts that
Y
is respectful of norms, or that
Y
fears punishments;
X
trusts in
Y
's honesty or
shame or ambition of good reputation, etc. To state this point even more clearly: the stronger
Y
's motive for doing
τ
τ
; the greater the number
of those motives; and the stronger
X
's beliefs about this; the stronger will be
X
's trust in
Y
to do
and then the stronger his commitment to
τ
.
9.5.3 Negotiation and Pacts: Trust as Premise and Consequence
If
X
is negotiating with
Y
over a possible agreement and pact this means that she has some form
and degree of trust in
Y
as (i) possible adequate and credible 'provider', and as (ii) willing and
capable negotiator. She is not just wasting her time or doing this for fun. She is already betting
and relying on
Y
to 'negotiate' and possibly achieve an agreement; and this is a possible bet
and reliance on
Y
to do the delegated task (good, service).
Negotiation and pacts (contracts)
presuppose
some trust. However, pacts and contracts are
there also to
create
some trust: the trust on which
Y
will, for example, give her money and
confidently wait for a return. In fact, as we just said (Section 9.4.2),
Y
's promise (implicit or
explicit), his 'commitment', gives
X
(additional) new bases for expecting that
Y
will act as
desired.
Y
now has some 'duty' to do so; there are social and moral norms binding him; and
X
is entitled to her expectations; she has some 'right' over
Y
. Thus
X
has additional trust in
Y
;
she feels more sure and safe.
With a 'contract' we have the added weight of legal authorities and guaranties to protect
X
and to oblige
Y
. So, negotiation and pacts are a social mechanism for producing trust by
investing trust; for building new forms and bases of trust on previous ones. However, as we
said, the new layer of trust is not always 'additional'; it is also completing or complementing
some possible lack and insufficiency of trust. If
X
does not trust
Y
enough on a mere informal
base, she would not rely on him. Then, a promise, pact, or contract gives her sufficient trust
by binding
Y
's decision. Nevertheless, some trust must always be already there before the
negotiation, or the promise, or the pact, or the contract. Why ask for a promise from
Y
if we
do not believe that he is promise-sensible and bound? Why invoke the official signature of a
contract if we perceive
Y
as indifferent to law, authority, sanctions, etc.?
9.6 Is Trust Based on Norms?
This is a quite diffused theory (especially in sociology; for example Garfinkel, 1963, and
Giddens, 1984. See also Section 2.2.2 for our criticism on A. Jones' position).
1) On one hand, one should not over exploit the very dangerous ambiguity of the notion
of 'norm' or of 'rule' in several languages, covering both a mere external descriptive
'regularity' (from Latin: 'regula', rule/norm), and a prescription or model aimed at inducing
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