The Glue of Society - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 260

Y 's 'adoption' of X 's goal and hope; on a positive (cooperative) attitude of Y (for whatever
reason) towards X 's delegation. This is precisely trust; the glue of society as the transition from
passive and powerless 'dependence' to active and empowering interdependence relationships.
As we saw, trust is not just an attitude, a passive disposition, a cognitive representation or an
affective state towards another person. It is also an active and pragmatic phenomenon; because
cognition (and affect) is pragmatic in general: for and in action, for realizing goals. So, trust is
also an action (deciding and performing an action of betting and relying on another guy) and
part of social actions: exchange, collaboration, obedience, etc.

9.2 Trust and Social Order
There is a special, substantial relationship between trust and social order; in both directions:
on the one side, 'institutional', 'systemic' trust (to use sociological terms), builds upon the
existence of shared rules, regularities, conventional practices, etc. and relies on this, in an
automatic, non-explicit, mindless way; but, on the other side, spontaneous, informal social
order (not the legal ones, with control roles and special authorities) exploits this form of trust
and works thanks to it (Garfinkel, 1963). In particular, the ' stabilization' of a given order
of shared practices and common rules, creates trust (expectation and reliance about those
behaviors), and this diffused and self-confirming trust (a self-fulfilling prophecy, as we know)
stabilizes the emergent social order.
Garfinkel's theory is quite important, although partial, restricted only to some form of
indirect trust, (he explicitly mentions 'trust' only a couple of time in quite a long paper),
strongly inspired by Parsons and Schutz and joined with (based on) a rather strange ideological
'proclamation' against the need for psychological sub-foundations, 1

which is systematically

contradicted one page later and throughout the entire paper.
The main thesis of Garfinkel is that social order and social structures of everyday life, emerge
and stabilize and work thanks to our natural 'suspension' of doubts, of uncertainty, of worries;
our by-default assumption is that what is coming will be normal, without surprises ('perceived
normality'). We build our everyday life on such economic assumption of 'normality' and
of shared, 'common' expectations about 'which game we are playing' and 'which are the
well-known rules of this game'. And we react to the violation of this presupposed order and
normality first of all by attempting to 'normalize' the event, to reinterpret it in another normal
frame and game. 2
Expectations about those rules and regularities, and the respect of them by the others, are
constitutive of the game we play. 'The social structures consist of institutionalized patterns
of normative culture; the stable features of the social structures as assemblies of concerted
actions are guaranteed by motivated compliance with a legitimate order' (p. 189).
Not only do the subjects suspend their possible vigilance and diffidence, but, they actively
and internally 'adhere' to this order, by using those normal rules and game-definition as
a' frame 'for' interpreting ' what is happening 3 (a rather psychological process!); and by
' accepting ' the events and the rules and the expectations themselves as 'natural', 'obvious'.

1 'Meaningful events [for a theory of trust] are entirely and exclusively events in a person's behavioral environment,
... . Hence there is no reason to look under the skull since nothing of interest is to be found there but brains' (p. 190).
2 Also because - we should add as cognitive scientist - for our need (mechanisms) of cognitive coherence and
integration, and of social integration and coherence.
3 'To be clear, bridge players react to the others' actions as bridge events not just as behavioral events'.