The Economic Reductionism and Trust (Ir)rationality - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 255

Y must be recognized, but X 's intention that Y recognizes this doesn't need to be recognized
(Castelfranchi, 2004).
As we have already highlighted (see Chapter 2) the act of trusting is an ambiguous
'signal', conveying various messages, and different possible meanings. And a cognitive
agent - obviously - reacts to the meaning of the event, which depends on his active in-
terpretation of it.
8.9 Concluding Remarks
We have argued against the idea that trust has necessarily to do with contexts that require
'reciprocation'; or that trust is trust in the other's reciprocation . We have also implicitly
adopted a distinction between, the concept of reciprocation/reciprocity as behavior and be-
havioral relation and the concept of reciprocation/reciprocity as motive and reason for doing
something beneficial for the other(s) (Cialdini, 2001).
On the basis of this conceptual disambiguition and of our analytic model, it has been
argued that we do not necessarily trust people because they will be willing to reciprocate; and
that we do not necessarily reciprocate for reciprocating. Trusting people (also in strict social
situations, with mutual awareness) means counting on their 'adopting' our needs, doing what
we expect from them, out of many possible motives (from altruism to norms keeping, from
fear of punishments to gratitude, from sexual attraction to reputation and social approval, etc.);
reciprocating or obtaining reciprocation are just two of them. However, the theory of how trust
elicits reciprocation and trust, and how reciprocation builds trust, is an important part of the
theory of trust as personal and collective capital.
Trust certainly has an enormous importance in economy and thus in economics (for ex-
change, market and contracts, for agency, for money and finance, for organizations, for reducing
negotiation costs, and so on.), as in politics (the foundational relations between citizens and
government, laws, institutions), etc. However, this concerns all kinds and dimensions of trust;
not only those aspects needed in strategic games.
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