The Economic Reductionism and Trust (Ir)rationality - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 254

8.7 The Varieties of Trust Responsiveness
As for the interesting idea that we respond to a trusting act (for example, by increasing our
benevolence, reliability, efficacy, etc.) we acknowledge that this is a very important claim (see
also (Falcone and Castelfranchi, 2001)); but it deserves some development.
As we have shown, trust has different components and aspects, so our claim is that we
respond to trust in various (even divergent) ways, since we can respond to different components
or faces of the trusting act , which can elicit a variety of emotions or behaviors.
For example, one thing is to react to the appreciation, the positive evaluation implicit in a
decision to trust and manifested by the act of trust; or to respond to the kindness of not being
suspicious, diffident; or to the exhibition of respect and consideration. For example, I might
not feel grateful but guilty; suffering from low self-esteem and feeling that X 's evaluation is
too generous and misleading and her expectation could be betrayed.
I could also respond to the fact that the trustor is taking a risk on me, is counting on me,
exposing her vulnerabilities to me by feeling 'responsible'. The trustor's manifestation of
being powerless, dependent on me, could elicit two opposite reactions. On the one hand, the
perceived lack of power and the appeal to me is the basis of possible feelings of pity, and of
a helpful, benevolent disposition. On the other hand, this can elicit a sense of exploitation, of
profiting, which will elicit anger and refusal of help: 'Clear! She knows that eventually there
will be this stupid guy (me!) taking care of that! She counts on this'.
We do not have a complete and explanatory theory of all the possible reasons why trust
elicits a behavior corresponding to the expectations.
8.8 Trusting as Signaling
It is clear that in those cases where the act or attitude of trust is supposed to elicit the desired
behavior, it is important that Y has to know (or at least to believe) X 's disposition. This applies
in both cases: when X just trusts and expects; when X is cooperating (doing something for Y )
because she trusts Y and expects a given behavior. Since X plans to elicit an adoptive behavior
from Y as a specific response to her act, she must ascertain that Y realizes her act toward him
and understands its intentional nature (and - in case of cooperation - the consequent creation
of some sort of 'debt'). This means that X 's behavior is - towards Y - a 'signal' meaning
something to him; in other and better words, it is a form of implicit 'communication' since
it is aimed to be a signal for Y and to mean all that ((Schelling, 1960), (Cramerer, 1988),
(Castelfranchi, 2004)).
X 's cooperation in view of some form of intentional reciprocation (of any kind) needs to
be a behavioral implicit communication act because Y 's understanding of the act is crucial
for providing the right motive for reciprocating. The same is for X 's reliance on Y aimed at
inducing Y 's adoption. This doesn't mean that X necessarily intends that Y understands that
she intends to communicate (Gricean meta-message): this case is possible and usual, but not
inevitable. Let us suppose, for example, that X desires some favor from Y and, in order to elicit
a reciprocating attitude, does something to help Y (say, offers a gift). It is not necessary (and
sometimes is even counterproductive) that Y realizes the selfish plan of X , and thus the fact that
she wants him to realize that she is doing something 'for' him and intends him to recognize
this. It is sufficient and necessary that Y realizes that X is intentionally doing something just
for him, and X 's act is certainly also aimed at such recognition by Y : X 's intention to favor