The Economic Reductionism and Trust (Ir)rationality - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 253

This diffused view is quite complicated: it mixes up a correct idea (the fact that trust - as
decision and action - implies a bet, taking some risk, being vulnerable ) with the reductive idea
of an anticipated cost, a unilateral contribution . But in fact, to contribute, to 'pay' something
in anticipation while betting on some 'reciprocation', is just one case of taking risks. The
expected beneficial action ('on which our welfare depends') from the other is not necessary
'in exchange'.
The risk we are exposed to and we accept when we decide to trust somebody, to rely and
depend on them, is not always the risk of wasting our invested resources, our 'anticipated
costs'. The main risk is the risk of not achieving our goal , of being disappointed over the
entrusted/delegated and needed action, although perhaps our costs are very limited (just a
verbal request) or nothing (just exploiting an independent action and coordinating our own
behavior). Sometimes, there is the risk of frustrating our goal forever since our choice of Y
makes inaccessible other alternatives that were present at the moment of our decision. We also
risk the possible frustration of other goals: for example, our self-esteem as a good and prudent
evaluator; or our social image; or other personal goods that we didn't protect from Y 's access.
Thus, it is very reductive to identify the risks of trust with the lack of reciprocation and thus
wast our investment; risk, which is neither sufficient nor necessary.
In fact, in another article, Pelligra recognizes and criticizes the fact that 'most studies [in
economics and game theory] consider trust merely as an expectation of reciprocal behavior'
while this is 'a very specific definition of trust' (Pelligra, 2006).
However, Pelligra - as we saw - in his turn proposes a very interesting but rather restricted
definition, which fits trust game and the previous conditions (especially (iii)). He defines trust
as characterized by the fact that X counts on Y 's responsiveness to X 's act of trusting ('The
responsive nature of Trust' is the title of the article). We believe this is too strong.
When X trusts Y - even when agreeing on something - she can rely on Y 's behavior not
because Y will respond to her act of trusting him, but for many other reasons. X can count on
the fact that there are norms and authorities (and (moral) sanctions) prescribing that behavior,
independently of X 's trust, and X assumes that Y is a worrying or respectful person. There
might be a previous norm (independent of the fact that X is trusting Y ), and X forecasts Y 's
behavior and is sure that Y will do as expected, just because the norm exists and Y knows it
(A. Jones, 2002). The fact that X is trusting Y is not (in X 's expectation) the reason behind Y 's
correct behavior.
However, let us assume that one wants to put aside, from a 'true'/'strict' notion of trust,
any kind of reason external to the interpersonal relationship (no norms, no third parties, no
contracts, etc.). There is some sort of 'genuine' trust ((Hardin, 2002), (K. Jones, 1996), (K.
Jones, 2001), (Baier, 1986)) which would be merely 'interpersonal' (see Chapter 2). From this
perspective, one might perhaps claim that 'genuine' trust is precisely based on responsiveness.
But this vision also looks too strong and narrow. It might be the case that Y behaves as expected
not because X trusts him but because X is dependent on him, for example for pity and help. He
would do the same even if X wouldn't ask or expect anything. For example, X to Y : 'Please,
please! Don't tell John what you saw. It would be a tragedy for me' ; Y to X : 'OK, be quiet!' ;
later, Z to X : 'How can you trust him!?' ; X : 'I trust him because he is a sensible person, he
understood my situation, he was moved'.
Furthermore, in general, X may count upon feelings or bonds of benevolence, friendship,
love: he counts on those motives that make Y do what is expected; not on Y 's responsiveness
to X 's trust in him; like in the 'genuine' trust of a child towards his father.