Information Technology Reference
In-Depth Information
as equivalent, simply shows how they are unable to take into account the interest and the
contribution of cognitive theory.
Risk is just about the possible outcome of a choice, about an event and a result; trust is
about somebody: it mainly consists of beliefs, evaluations, and expectations about the other
actor, their capabilities, self-confidence, willingness, persistence, morality (and in general
motivations), goals and beliefs, etc. Trust
in
somebody basically is (or better at least include
and is based on) a rich and complex theory of them and of their mind. Conversely distrust or
mistrust is not simply a pessimistic esteem of probability: it is diffidence, suspicion, negative
evaluation
relative to
somebody.
From the traditional economic perspective all this is both superfluous and naive (non-
scientific, rhetoric): common-sense notions. The economists do not want to admit the insuffi-
ciency of the economic theoretical apparatus and the opportunity of its cognitive completion.
But they are wrong - even within the economic domain - not only because of the growing
interest in economics towards a more realistic and psychologically-based model of the eco-
nomic actor, but because mental representations of the economic agents and their images are,
for example, precisely the topic of marketing and advertising (that we might well suppose has
something to do with commerce).
8.3.7 Probability Mixes up Various Kinds of Beliefs, Evaluations,
Expectations about the Trustee and Their Mind
We claim that the richness of the mental ingredients of trust cannot and should not be com-
pressed simply in the subjective probability estimated by the actor for their decision. But
why do we need an explicit account of the mental ingredients of trust (beliefs, evaluations,
expectations, goals, motivations, model of the other), i.e. of the
mental background
of reliance
and 'probability' and 'risk' components?
First,
because otherwise we will neither be able to explain or to predict the agent's risk
perception and decision
. Subjective probability is not a magic and arbitrary number; it is
the consequence of the actor beliefs and theories about the world and the other agents. We
do not arrive at a given expectation only on the basis of previous experiences or on the
frequency of a series of events. We are able to make predictions based on other factors, like:
analogical reasoning (based on a few examples, not on 'statistics'); other forms of reasoning
like 'class-individual-class' (for example I can trust
Y
because he is a doctor and I trust
- which has come to be standard practice in the social science literature
-(
...
)'. The title of section 2.1 is in fact
'Trust as Risk'. Williamson is right in the last claim. This emptying of the notion of trust is not only his own aim,
it is quite traditional in sociological and game-theoretic approaches. For example in the conclusions of his famous
topic Gambetta says: '
When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the
probability
that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us is high enough for us to
consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him' ((Gambetta, 1988) p. 217). What is dramatically not clear
in this view is what 'trust' does
explicitly
mean! In fact the expression cited by Williamson (the 'elusive notion of
trust') is from Gambetta. His objective is the elimination of the notion of trust from economic and social theory (it
can perhaps survive in the social psychology of interpersonal relationships). 'The recent tendency for sociologists /the
attack is mainly to Coleman and to Gambetta/ and economists alike to use the term 'trust' and 'risk' interchangeably
is, on the arguments advanced here, ill-advised' ((Gambetta, 1988) p. 274).
Search WWH ::
Custom Search