The Economic Reductionism and Trust (Ir)rationality - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 240

based on evidence (observations, reports, reasoning, or learning). Trust is not contradictory to
reasoning, argumentation, proof, demonstrations. In some sense some scholars mix up trust
with faith.
Faith in the strict sense is not simply to believe something or in something without sufficient
evidences. It is to believe not 'on the base of', 'in force of' evidence (even if evidence was
there). Thus, in a sense it is renouncing evidence, refusing it; believing on a non-rational
(reasons-based) ground. Frequently this is a meta-attitude; an aim. Faith rejects the need for
evidence because the fact of desiring or searching for evidence or the attempt to ground our
attitude on evidence is per se a 'sign' of doubt, a signal that we are doubting or might doubt. But
real faith does not admit any doubt: either to doubt is prohibited ('dogma'); or we want to avoid
or reject any doubt (which - notice - is some sort of meta-cognitive perception and activity).
The doubt invalidates the faith; it proves that the faith is no (longer) there. Trust on the
contrary is evidence-based; not only is it not 'incompatible' with evidence (like faith), but it is
inspired by evidence, signs, or experience. Not in the sense that it has always good and sufficient
evidence, or that that evidence is always real 'reasons'. Actually trust can be based on different
kinds of 'evidence', including feelings and emotions, intuition, practice, or mere plausibility
('not impossible'). But, in the sense that it is not aimed at being indifferent to evidence;
evidence is very 'relevant' for trust, but not for real faith. Given this 'irrelevance' of evidence,
not only is faith 'optimistic' and would also consider the 'plausible', but, it will even go against
counter-evidence. It is indifferent to proof. Even if there was proof against what I believe, it
is irrelevant to me, not taken into consideration. Faith aims at being non-rational (Occam).
We talk about 'faith' in a weak/broad sense, or more often 'faithful' trust, trust not justified
or supported by the subjective evidences; blind; or trust not searching for evidence on the basis
of some sort of meta-trust or default attitude. However, this is not the real, deep meaning of
'faith', and it is not the authentic, typical form of trust (as some authors claim).
8.2.2 Risk Perception
When we say that trust always implies some risk; that there is 'trust' and it is needed precisely
because one has to assume some risk, we do not mean that this risk is necessarily explicit or
focused in the mind of the trusting agent. Notice that this is not an ad hoc solution for an old
controversial issue, it is just a general aspect of the theory of beliefs (Section 8.2.1) that we
take for granted the grounding of trust attitudes (and thus decisions) on beliefs. Not only can
beliefs be out of the focus of attention, or unconscious or even 'removed' in a psychoanalytic
sense, but they can simply be 'implicit'. As we just said, one fundamental way in which beliefs
are implicit is that they are just 'potential'; they are implied by the explicit data that we believe,
but that has not yet been derived, not explicitly formulated or 'written' in some file or memory.
Subjectively speaking, for example, an agent can be fully trustful, not worrying at all, just
because subjectively they don't perceive any risk and don't calculate the very small eventuality
of a failure or harm. Subjectively their curve of probability is tending to a limit, is flat: 90,
95, 98% is equal to 100%, although this is actually impossible and realistically irrational (no
prediction can be 100% certain about the future). 9
9 Even dead - contrary to moralistic 'memento mori' - subjectively speaking is not sure: 'Who knows? Perhaps
they will invent some miraculous drugs and interventions'; 'Who knows? Perhaps the water of immortality really
exists; or perhaps there is resurrection and eternal life'.