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the previous definition to something like this: 'When I say that I trust
Y
, I mean that
I believe
that, put on test, Y would act in a way favorable to me, even though this choice would not be
the most convenient for
his private, selfish motives
at that moment, but the
adopted
interests
of mine will - for whatever reason and motive - prevail'
.
4
At this level,
trust is a theory and an expectation about the kind of motivations the agent
is endowed with, and about which will be the prevailing motivations in case of conflict.
This preserves the former definition (and our definition in Chapter 1) by just adding some
specification about the
motives
for
Y
's reliability: for example, the beliefs about
Y'
s morality
are supports for the beliefs about
Y
's intention and persistence. I not only believe that he will
intend and persist (and then he will do), but I believe that he will persist
because of certain
motives
, that are more important than other motives that would induce him to defection
and betrayal. And these motives are already there: in his mind and in our agreement; I
don't' have to find new incentives, to think of additional prizes or of possible punishments.
If I am doing so (for example, promising or threatening) I don't really trust
Y
(yet) (see
Section 9.5.2).
After an agreement we trust
Y
because of the advantages we promised (if it is the case),
but also or mainly because we believe that he has other important motives (like his reputation,
or to be honest, or to respect the laws, or to be nice, or to be helpful, etc.) for behaving as
expected.
This is the crucial link between 'trusting' and the image of 'a good person'. 'Honest' is
an agent who prefers his goal of not cheating and not violating norms to other goals such as
pursuing his own private benefits.
5
Social trust is not only a mental 'model' of
Y
's cognitive
and practical capacities, it is also a model of his motives and preferences, and tells us a lot
about his morality.
In this framework, it is quite clear why we trust friends. First, we believe that as friends
they want our good, they want to help us; thus they will both take on our request and will keep
their promise. Moreover, they do not have reasons for damaging us or for hidden aggressing
us. Even if there is some conflict, some selfish interest against us, friendship will be more
important for them. We rely on the
motivational strength
of friendship.
As we explained in Chapter 2 these beliefs about
Y
's virtues and motives are sub-species of
trust, not just beliefs and reasons supporting our trust in
Y
.
Rational Is Not Equal to Selfish
As we have just seen, it is incorrect to (implicitly) claim that the trustor relies on the trustee's
irrationality (not acting out of self-interest, not pursuing their own goals and rewards);
the
trustor is just ascribing to the trustee motives (perhaps unselfish ones) which will induce Y to
behave conformingly to X's expectations
.
4
Notice that this is a definition only of the most typical social notion of trust, where
X
relies on
Y
's
adoption
of
her goals (Chapter 2). As we know, we admit weaker and broader forms of trust where
Y
is not even aware of
X
's
delegation.
5
It is important to remind us that this is not necessary and definitional for trust: I can trust
Y
for what I need, I can
delegate him,
just relying on his selfish interests
in doing as expected. Like in commerce (see Adam Smith's citation
in Chapter 2, Section 2.8).
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