Dynamics of Trust - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 181

of trust in Y . This kind of crisis is a bit different from those previously shown: X could again
evaluate Y as able to realize the task, but she considers whether other available agents would
be more suitable delegates ( W or Z ).
We can resume the reasons of this crisis in the following way:

i) given new X 's beliefs on Y 's features, on the context, and on features of other agents,
we can have a trust crisis in Y with delegation of the task to another agent ( Z or W in
Figure 6.19).
ii) due to a deeper analysis of her own beliefs about the appropiateness of the delegated
task to the achievement of the goal; in particular in the better analyzed and defined
context/environment ( X realizes that (given that context) action does not achieve the

state p ; and/or p does not include/determine g X ). These considerations are also true in the
case in which there is more than one agent available for delegation: in fact, there is no added
value (nor is there unsufficient added value) with the presence of more potential trustees.
iii) due to the decrease of the goal's value g X . In particular, the cost of delegation (in its
general terms, not only in economic sense) is not comparable with (is not paid from) the
achievement of the goal. And this is true even in the case of a presence of more potential
trustees.

α

In the final, more complete, version of the trust model we introduce the question of the con-
temporary presence of X 's goals, evaluating the competition among them and the consequent
dynamics for the evaluation of the priorities (Figure 6.20).
In this case the decrease of a goal's value (say g ) and the increase of the value of another
one (say g ) could elicit X 's trust crisis toward Y with respect to . This crisis is not based on

Y 's intervened inadequacy (depending on his own features, or on the new conflicting context,
or on the presence of other more efficient and valued competitors). But the problem is that
changing the priorities among X's goals, also changes the task X has to delegate and maybe Y
has not got the right features for this new task (at least in X 's beliefs).
This last example shows how our trust model is able to reconcile the two main cognitive
ingredients: beliefs and goals . On this basis it can produce relevant forecasts: trust can change or
collapse on both the brows (and they are very different phenomena). Current models (expecially
in social, political and economical fields) neglect the relevant role of the goals , superficially
disregarding the implications of a deep analysis between beliefs and goals differences.
Resuming and concluding this paragraph on the trust crisis we would like underline this
difference:

τ

a) On the one hand, there could be beliefs crisis ( revision ): change of opinion, recep-
tion of new information and evidences about Y 's features, abilities, virtues, willingness,
persistence, honesty, loyalty, and so on. As a consequence X 's evaluation and trust can
collapse.
b) Very different, on the other hand, is the crisis of goals :if X no longer has that goal, she
does not want achieve it, the crisis of trust between X and Y is very different. It has in fact
concluded the presupposition, the assumption and the willingness of the cooperation, of
the delegation.

X does not think about being dependent on Y : she is not more interested about what Y does
or is able to do: it is irrelevant for her. The detachment is more basic and radical: referring to