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belief could change
Y
's trustworthiness, either because
Y
will adopt
X
's goal as an additional
motivation and accept such an exploitation, or because, on the contrary,
Y
will refuse such an
exploitation, changing his behaviour and reacting to the delegation (there is in fact also a third
case, in which this knowledge does not influence
Y
's behaviour and beliefs: we do not consider
this case). After the action of delegation we have in fact a new situation
'
(if delegation is
the only event that influences the trustworthiness) and we can have two possible results:
i) the new trustworthiness of
Y
as for
is greater than the previous one; at least one of the
two possible elementary components is increased:
OdA
,
OdW
;sowecanwrite:
τ
trustworthiness
(
Y
τ
)
=
F
(
Od A
Y
,τ,
,
OdW
Y
,τ,
)-
F
(
Od A
Y
,τ,
,
OdW
Y
,τ,
)
>
0
(6.11)
ii)
Y
's new reliability as for
τ
has reduced
trustworthiness
(
Y
τ
)
<
0
(6.12)
τ
also in order to let/make
X
achieve
its goal
g
. Such adoption of
X
's goal can be for several possible motives, from instrumental
and selfish, to pro-social.
The components' degree can change in different ways: the degree of ability (
OdA
) can
increase because, for example,
Y
could invest more attention in the performance, use additional
tools, new consulting agents, and so on; the degree of willingness (
OdW
) can increase because
Y
could have additional motives and a firm intention, and so on (the specific goal changes its
level of priority).
In case (
6.12
)
Y
on the contrary reacts in a negative way (for
X
) to the discovery of
X
's
reliance and exploitation; for some reason
Y
is now less willing or less capable of doing
In case (
6.11) Y
has adopted
X
's goal, i.e. he is doing
.
In
fact in case (ii) too, the reliability components can be independently affected: first, the degree
of ability (
OdA
) can decrease because
Y
could be upset about the
X
's exploitation and
Y's
ability could be compromised; again, the willingness degree (
OdW
) can decrease (
Y
will have
less intention, attention, etc.).
Notice that in this case the change of
Y
's reliability is not known by
X
. So, even if
X
has a per-
fect perception of previous
Y
's trustworthiness (that is our hypothesis), in this new situation -
with weak delegation -
X
can have an under or over estimation of
Y
's trustworthiness. In other
terms, after the weak delegation (and if there is a change of
Y
's trustworthiness following it)
we have:
τ
DoT
X
,
Y
,τ,
=
trustworthiness
(
Y
τ
')
(6.13)
Let us show you the flow chart for the weak delegation (Figure 6.4): in it we can see
how, on the basis of the mental ingredients of the two agents, the more or less collaborative
behaviours of the trustee could be differently interpreted by the trustor. In the case of the
mutual knowledge about the awareness of the weak-delegation (but not interpreted as a tacit
request and agreement), the trustor could evaluate and learn if
Y
is a spontaneous collaborative
agent (with respect that task in that situation) and how much
Y
is so collaborative (the value
of
). In the case in which
X
ignores
Y
's awareness about the weak delegation, the trustor
could evaluate the credibility of its own beliefs (both about
Y
's trustworthiness and about
Y
's
awareness of the weak delegation) and, if the case, revises them.
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