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In sum, there are three cases, three 'games' played by our ignorance: (i) to play in favor of
trust; (ii) to remain indifferent, in between; (iii) to play against trust. (ii) and (iii) are both 'lack
of trust', but with two distinguishable faces: unsolved doubts
versus
suspect and diffidence.
On the one hand,
X's
trust in
Y
acquires two 'components': the
positive evaluation part
(
γ
),
and the
simply credited part
(
δ
). And there can be quite different proportions between them,
for example:
γ
=
0
, that is, pure '
faith'
in
Y
, without any evidence (see note 11 in Chapter 3);
δ
=
0, that is, a stingy trust (perhaps sufficient), mere esteem based on evidences and 'after
due considerations', without any additional credit.
trust can be necessary (in some decisions) in order to pass the
decision threshold; but probably with a greater perception of
uncertainty
. In our model, in
fact, the subjective/perceived 'uncertainty' is the function of two independent dimensions: the
amount of ignorance, of lack of data; the balance between the pros and the cons. The greater
the lack of data, the
perceived ignorance
, the greater the perceived 'uncertainty'; but also: the
smaller the difference between the data in favor of
P
and those in favor of
Not-P
, the greater
the perceived 'uncertainty'.
For example, given the same gap of ignorance ('plausibility'), say 60%, our perceived
uncertainty is greater if the probability of
P
is 20% and the probability of
Not-P
is 20%, rather
than if the probability of
P
is 35% while
Not-P
is just 5%.
These two kinds of uncertainty have a different nature: the first (
due to lack of data
) is about
the evidence; the second (
equilibrium between evidence in favor of P and Not-P
) is about the
decision to take. However, there is a relationship between them: for example, the first implies
the second one.
Our previous claim was simply that the feeling of trust (given a decision and delegation,
that is, when
It is important to note that
δ
γ
+
δ
γ
are higher than the required threshold) will be quite different if
is very
δ
consistent or even sufficient and
is just additional and reassuring, compared with the situation
α
β
where
is necessary for the decision. This also means that the
risk perceived
(taken into account) and accepted in the moment of the decision to trust, has two
faces: on the one hand, it is the part representing true distrust,
bad evaluations and prediction
(
is weak or insufficient and
); on the other hand, it can just be the
lack of positive evidence
, perceived ignorance, but
perhaps given as 'plausibly' in favor.
Not only it is a matter of how much risk
X
is disposed to take (subjectively), but also how
blindly
X
accept it.
ω
4.8.4 Distrust as Not Giving Credit
If there is an
trust ('there is no evidence but I give it in favor
of
P
'), then there also exists a
distrust
of the first kind (
γ
(evidence-based) trust and a
δ
) and another form of distrust: a 'lack
of trust' assumed in a pessimistic attitude as against
P
(
ω
).
10
As we said, the 'lack of trust'
can cover both 'distrust' in the strict sense (negative evaluations and expectations), and lack
λ
10
Notice that this operation of 'taking as favorable/good' or 'taking as unfavorable/bad' more precisely is an
operation of assumption ('acceptance') than of 'belief'.
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