Socio-Cognitive Model of Trust: Quantitative Aspects - Trust Theory: A Socio-Cognitive and Computational Model - page 107

utility, in this case the cost of the additional knowledge about Y exceeds its utility: X already
has enough evidence to delegate. Only, in this case, the well-grounded trust in Y is 'too much'.
But notice that we cannot call it 'over-confidence'.
In sum, there are three cases of 'too much trust':
More positive trust in Y than necessary for delegating. It is not true that 'I trust Y too much'
but it is the case that I need too much security and information than effectively necessary.
Ihavemoretrustin Y than he deserves; part of my evaluations and expectations are faithful
and unwarranted; I do not see or do not take into account the actual risk. This is a case of
over-confidence . This is dangerous and irrational trust.
My evaluation of Y is correct but I'm too risk prone; I accept too much ignorance and
uncertainty, or I bet too much on a low probability. This is another case of over-confidence ,
and of dangerous and irrational trust.
Which are the consequences of over-confidence in delegation?
Delegating to an unreliable or incompetent Y .
Lack of control over Y ( Y does not provide his service, or provides a bad service, etc.).
Delegation which is too 'open': unchecked misunderstandings, Y 's inability to plan or to
choose, etc.
Which, on the contrary, are the consequences of insufficient confidence, of an excess of
diffidence in delegation?
We do not delegate and rely on good potential partners; we miss good opportunities; there
is a reduction of exchanges and cooperation.
We search and wait for too many evidences and proofs.
We make too many controls, losing time and resources and creating interferences and
conflicts.
We specify the task/role too much without exploiting Y 's competence, intelligence, or
local information; we create too many rules and norms that interfere with a flexible and
opportunistic solution.
So, some diffidence, some lack of trust, prudence and the awareness of being ignorant are
obviously useful; but, also, trusting is at the same time useful. Which is the right ratio between
trust and diffidence? Which is the right degree of trust?
The right level of positive trust in Y (esteem) is when the marginal utility of the additional
evidence on Y (its contribution for a rational decision) seems inferior to the cost for acquiring
it (including time).
The right degree of trust for delegating (betting) is when the risk that we accept in the case
of failure is inferior to the expected subjective utility in the case of success (the equation
is more complex since we have also to take into account alternative possible delegations or
actions).