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success
to do by herself
U(X)
p+
U(X)
p-
failure
success
delegation
U(X)
d+
U(X)
d-
failure
to do nothing
U(X)
0
Figure 3.4
Decision Tree for Trust-based Delegation. (Reproduced with kind permission of Springer
Science+Business Media
C
2001)
One should also consider that trust (the attitude and/or the act) may have a value
per se
,
independently on the achieved results of the 'delegated' task ((McLeod, 2006)
Stanford Ency-
clopedia
). This value is taken into account in the decision. For example, if to have/show/put
trust in
Y
is a positive thing (for the subject or for the social environment
X
cares about)
this 'value' (the satisfaction of this additional goal) should be included among the results
(outcomes) of the decision to trust
Y
; and it might be determinant for the choice, even winning
against worries and doubts. Vice versa, if trust is a negative fact (for example, a sign of naivety,
of weakness of character, etc., of stupidity) this effect too will be taken into account in the
decision.
Among the positive results of the act of trusting (successful or unsuccessful; see Figure 3.4)
X
will put the value of trusting
in se
and
per se
; in the opposite case, among the positive results
of the act of trusting (successful or unsuccessful)
X
will put the negative value (cost, harm) of
trusting
in se
and
per se
.
However, for the sake of simplicity, we will consider the following scenario (Figure 3.5):
In the simplified scenario, in order to delegate we must have (using the Expected Utility Theory
approach by Bernoulli and von Neumann and Morgenstern (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944)):
∗
U
(
X
)
d
+
+
∗
U
(
X
)
p
+
+
DoT
XY
τ
(1-
DoT
XY
τ
)
U
(
X
)
d
−
>
DoT
XX
τ
(1-
DoT
XX
τ
)
U
(
X
)
p
−
(3.4)
where
DoT
XX
τ
.
Analyzing more carefully the different kinds of utilities we can say that:
is the
selftrust
of
X
about
τ
U(X)
p
+
=
Value(g)
+
Cost [Performance(X
τ
)],
U(X)
p
−
=
Cost [Performance(X
τ
)]
+
Additional Damage for failure
U(X)
d
+
=
Value(g)
+
Cost [Delegation(X Y
τ
)],
U(X)
d
−
=
Cost [Delegation(X Y
τ
)]
+
Additional Damage for failure
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