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2.11.1 Concern
A very important notion in goal-adoption is the notion of concern . How much the goal of X
is important for Y ; how much Y is concerned with/by X 's interest. That is, which is for Y the
value of X 's goal g X , or best way of X achieving her goal. This value is determined by:
(i) the reasons (higher motivations) that Y has for adopting X 's goal, and their value for him;
how much and why Y cares about X 's welfare;
(ii) X s opinion about the subjective value of g X for Y .
It is precisely on this basis that the adopted goal will prevail or not against possible costs,
against other private conflicting goals of Y , and thus will possibly become/produce an adoptive
intention of Y ; and will also - as intention - persist against possible new interferences and
temptations.
It is precisely on Y 's concern for X 's goal (not be confused with benevolence, good will,
benignity, and so on) that X relies while betting on Y 's adoptive intention and persistence. She
also has some 'theory' about the reasons Y should be concerned with her welfare and wish to
adopt her goal.
2.11.2 How Expectations Generate (Entitled) Prescriptions:
Towards 'Betrayal'
It is characteristic of the most typical/genuine forms of social trust that - in case of failure -
X is not only surprised and disappointed (Miceli and Castefranchi, 2002; Castelfranchi and
Giardini, 2003), but feels betrayed . Where does this affective reaction come from? On which
beliefs and goals (present in the trust attitude) is it based?
Social expectation can be entitled, can be based on Y 's 'commitment' and thus obligation
towards X (Castelfranchi, 1995). What X expects from Y can be 'due'. The violation of this
kind of expectations involves not only disappointment but stronger and social emotions, like
anger, indignation, etc. In particular it is different if this entitlement, this duty of Y towards
X comes from legal norms or from interpersonal relations and merely social norms, like in a
promise or like in friendship where fairness and adoption are presupposed.
In these forms of 'genuine' trust, where the expectation of Y 's adopting/caring of my needs,
requests, wishes (goals), is based on an assumption of a moral duty towards me, if Y disappoints
this expectation I feel betrayed by Y in my trust and reliance on him.
This commitment - and the consequent moral duty, social norm -is not necessarily es-
tablished in an explicit way; for example by a promise. Not only - as we said - can it be
presupposed in the very relationship between us: friends, same family, same group, shared
identity (which create some solidarity). It can be established by tacit consent, implicit behav-
ioral communication (Castelfranchi, 2006; Tummolini and Castelfranchi, 2006). See Table 2.5
for an example.
In general, this mechanism is responsible for the tendency of shared social expectations
(expectations about the behavior of the other agents, which are common knowledge) to
become prescriptions : not only I predict that you will do something, but I wish so; I want you
to behave in such a way (expectation). Moreover, I know that you know (etc.), and you did
not disconfirm this (etc.), so you get some obligation of not violating my expectations. And I
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