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As seen in Section 1.5.7, we have three kinds of social goal-adoption (Conte and Castel-
franchi, 1995): Instrumental , Cooperative and Terminal .
X can trust Y , and trusts that Y will do as expected, for any kind of adoption , also (or better,
usually) instrumental (with both external or internal incentives). Trust in Y doesn't presuppose
that Y is ' generous' or that he will make ' sacrifices' for X ; he can strictly be selfish.
Now, we can formulate in a more reasonable way Deutsch's claim and definition, without
giving the impression of trust as counting on Y 's altruism or even irrationality.
Y can be self-motivated or interested (autonomous, guided by his own goals) and can even
be selfish or egoistic; what matters is that the intention to adopt X 's goal (and thus the adopted
goal and the consequent intention to do
α
) will prevail on other non-adoptive, private (and
perhaps selfish) goals of Y . But this only means that:
Y's (selfish) motives for adopting X's goal will prevail on Y's (selfish) motives for
not doing so and giving precedence to other goals.
So, X can count on Y doing as expected, in X 's interest (and perhaps for Y 's interest).
Trustworthiness is a social 'virtue' but not necessarily an altruistic one. This also makes it
clear that not all 'genuine' trust is 'normative' (based on norms) (for example, the generous
impulse of helping somebody who is in serious danger is not motivated by the respect of a
moral/social norm, even if this behavior (later) is socially/morally approved).
Moreover, not all 'normative' trust is 'genuine'. We can trust somebody for doing (or not
doing
) just because we know that he has to do so (for a specific law or role), independently
on his realizing or not and adopting or not our goal. For example, I trust a policeman for
blocking and arresting some guy who was being aggressive to me, not because he has to
respond to my desire, but just because he is a policeman at the scene of a crime (he can even
ignore me). 51
In sum, in genuine trust X just counts upon the fact that Y will understand and care of her
(delegated) goal, Y will adopt her goal and possibly prefer it against conflicting goal (for
example selfish ones), and this for whatever reason: from selfish advantages to altruism, from
duty and obligations to cooperation, from love to identification, and so on.
In addition, May Tuomela (Tuomela, 2003) introduces and defines an interesting notion of
'genuine' social trust. But in our view this notion is too limited and specific. We disagree with
her constraint that there is genuine trust only when it is symmetrical and reciprocal (for us this
is counterintuitive and restrictive). In addition, her conditions (to be respected, the fact that
the other will care about my rights, etc.) look quite peculiar in terms of specific - important -
social relationships where there is 'genuine' trust, but which exclude other typical situations
of trust (like child-mother) that must be covered. 52
α
51 It is also important to not mix up 'genuine' adoption-based trust with trust in 'strong delegation': delegation
based on X 's request and Y 's acceptance. 'Genuine' trust can also be there in weak and in mild delegation/reliance:
when Y ignores X 's reliance and acts on his own account, or when Y 's behavior is elicited by X (but without Y 's
understanding). In fact, Y might have spontaneous reasons for adopting X 's interests (and X might count on and
exploit this), or X might elicit in Y adoptive motives and attitudes by manipulating Y , without Y knowing that X is
expecting and counting upon his adoption.
52 Paradoxically, sometimes we trust Y precisely for his selfishness, which makes him trustworthy and reliable for
that task/mission.
 
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