Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
taken to mean that, if one brings a person into existence, then whoever
she is she may thereby be benefited (or harmed).' For instance, we might
refer to a couple's possible next child as 'their next child' and claim that
'if, in the future, anything satisfies it, this individual might be benefited
(or harmed) by coming into existence.'
2
I agree with Holtug that the
identifiability problem is not damaging for the Value of Existence View.
Another objection against the view that coming into existence can
benefit a being claims that this view is logically incomprehensible. After
all, if existence is claimed to be better for a person than non-existence,
than non-existence must be worse for that person than existence. This
can be considered a conceptual or even logical requirement. But a non-
existent person cannot have any properties, so non-existence cannot be
worse for her.
3
Holtug tries to dismiss this so-called No Properties of the Non-Existent
Objection. Holtug defends the following proposition:
P: Non-existence is worse for Jeremy than existence.
4
Holtug argues as follows. The assumption is that Jeremy's life includes
a surplus of positive values and that his non-existence involves no
such values. Both claims are compatible with the No Properties of the
Non-Existent Principle. Holtug goes on:
it seems to be better to have a surplus of positive value than to have
no value. Contrariwise, it seems to be worse to have no value than it
is to have a surplus of value. This judgment relies only on the nature
of positive value and no value.
5
Now, what can we make of Holtug's claim if we assume that value must
always be the value
for someone
? Someone who does not exist cannot
'have' any properties, not even 'zero value' on the welfare scale. After all,
the welfare scale is about prudential value. This value is always subject-
related. We cannot talk about subject-relative value without reference
to any subject. The comparison only holds if value as such counts, but
the comparison cannot be about subject-relative value, because in the
case of non-existence there is no subject to which value accrues. The
comparative judgement cannot be made without ascribing properties to
the non-existent.
One can say that the view that coming into existence can benefit
a being needs not attach any properties to the being in the state of
non-existence, only the absence of properties. But ascribing to the
Search WWH ::
Custom Search