Total View versus Prior Existence View - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 78

beings should be taken into account in the aggregation of welfare. The
two main views in this debate are the Total View and the Prior Existence
View. The Total View claims that all existing beings and also all possible
beings including contingent beings count. The Prior Existence View
counts all existing beings as moral objects, as well as those possible
beings whose existence does not depend on the moral choice that is
contemplated. These are the beings that already exist or will exist, inde-
pendently of the moral choice that is contemplated: so-called necessary
beings. Contingent beings, on the other hand, whose existence depends
on the moral choice that is contemplated, do not count morally. So, the
Prior Existence View makes a distinction between those who do or will
exist independently of the moral choice that is contemplated and those
whose existence depends on the moral choice that is contemplated. The
first count morally, the second do not.
At first glance, not counting the welfare of contingent beings in the
evaluation of outcomes seems to be at odds with the utilitarian require-
ment of impartiality. The Prior Existence View needs two assumptions in
order to be compatible with utilitarian impartiality. It needs the assump-
tion that the evaluation of outcomes should be concerned with benefits
and harms to sentient beings. In addition it needs the assumption that
causing a being to exist cannot benefit or harm that being. After all, if
what counts is maximizing the net benefit of sentient beings, and if
bringing a being into existence cannot benefit or harm that being, then,
and only then, it makes sense to neglect the possible welfare of contin-
gent beings in the evaluation of outcomes. Both assumptions will be
explored and defended in the following two chapters.