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features of a being's life
? This criterion is about the relation of a being's
life to reality. It is about whether a being does in fact live, will live or has
lived, as compared to might live or surely will never live. Thus, whether
the possible welfare of a possible being counts might depend on how
likely it is that the potential being will come into existence. This kind of
(modal) distinction will be further discussed below.
For a utilitarian, acknowledging a moral status means that a being
possessing it is morally considerable. Effects of an action on this being's
welfare have to be included in moral considerations. The general utilitarian
answer to the question of who has moral status is simple and straight-
forward: As far as an action (including omission) affects anyone's welfare,
those effects have to be taken into account. That is why all sentient beings
are accorded moral status and plants and stones are not. That is also why
it is irrelevant whether a sentient being is black or white, male or female,
human or non-human. On this basis, it can be argued that future beings
should count morally. This means that in our moral decision-making we
should take into account the effects on the welfare of beings that live in
the future, for instance in choices that affect the environment. Presentists
deny this. They can only account for the welfare of future individuals via
the interests of (some) present beings. In general, utilitarians agree that
the welfare of all sentient beings should equally be taken into account,
no matter which individual the being is, where it lives, and when it lives.
For a utilitarian, the question whose welfare to count in the aggregation
of welfare is the question who should have moral status.
It is important to note that not all potential beings will become actual
beings. A being that is a possible being at a certain time might in fact
never come to live. For instance, a couple's possible 'next child' might
never be conceived. It might never be an actual sentient being. Therefore,
potential beings do not always live at a different time. They might not
come to exist at all. Often it will be uncertain whether they will come
to exist. As I already mentioned, beings that may or may not come to
exist are called contingent beings. They are distinguished from 'neces-
sary beings', i.e. beings that live, have lived, or will for sure live. The
distinction between a contingent being and a necessary being concerns
the modal features of their lives. It is about how 'real' they are or will be.
This distinction is arguably different in kind from the distinction on the
basis of gender, species, location, or temporal location. A crucial ques-
tion is whether the distinction is morally relevant.
In what follows, I will introduce two rival views about this issue. One
of those views, the Prior Existence View, decides whether or not to count
a being's welfare on the basis of the modal features of that being's life,
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