Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
it is that death frustrates the fulfilment of those desires. If, in contrast,
a being does not have any desires for the future, death will not frus-
trate those desires. Killing such a being would not have any negative
effect on welfare. Thus, generally, the more future-oriented a being is, the
less replaceable it is. Those who have more and stronger future-oriented
desires are likely to leave greater 'minuses' when killed. Singer brings
forward the desire to go on living as an important criterion. According
to Singer, those who have future-oriented desires, and a desire to go on
living, are not replaceable. Since this characteristic varies in degrees, so
varies the degree to which an individual is replaceable. For instance, a
being that, though conscious, has no desires for the future is completely
replaceable. This means it is replaceable without leaving a 'minus'. In the
second edition of
Practical Ethics
, Singer mentions fish as an example.
After new insights into the capacities of fish, Singer does not consider fish
completely replaceable any more. Now, Singer simply states that 'if such
animals exist' they are fully replaceable. Indeed, it is unclear whether
sentient beings without any desires exist at all. Beings that have desires,
but whose desires concern only the near future, are likely to leave only
small minuses, and are thus more replaceable, according to Singer.
Those familiar with the second edition of
Practical Ethics
might note
that this gradual view of the possession of the relevant characteristics
and thus of replaceability is not made explicit there. To the contrary, in
his second edition of
Practical Ethics
, Singer frames the distinction as one
between persons and non-persons. Persons are those beings, human or
non-human, who possess certain characteristics, such as self-awareness
and rationality. Persons possess a sense of their own existence over time
and future-directed desires.
18
Those characteristics are deemed relevant
with regard to replaceability. Singer's framing of the relevant distinction
as one between 'persons' and 'non-persons' - and Singer's talk (in the
introduction to his second edition of
Practical Ethics
) about 'drawing
clear lines' between who is replaceable and who is not - suggest a
dichotomy between those who are replaceable (non-persons) and those
who are not (persons). In any case, Singer currently explicitly assumes
a gradual account of the possession of those characteristics, and thus
also a gradual account of personhood. Since personhood, as Singer now
makes clear, comes in degrees, so does replaceability.
19
So, now we know how Singer proposes to limit the scope of
the Replaceability Argument. He does this by recurring to the
desire-satisfaction account of welfare, in combination with the moral
ledger model. We also have at least a rough idea of who would be replace-
able and who would not. The division is not drawn between humans
Search WWH ::
Custom Search