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of one being should somehow compensate for the death of another does
have an air of peculiarity.'
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If beings are replaceable, this holds not only for non-human animals,
but also for human beings, unless a morally relevant criterion can be
found for making distinctions. The distinction between who is replace-
able and who is not should not, according to utilitarianism, be made in an
arbitrary way. Hence, the question comes up whether all sentient beings
are replaceable. What would proponents of the Replaceability Argument
think of the idea that not only non-human animals but also humans are
replaceable? The idea that the Replaceability Argument would also hold
for human beings has led to consternation.
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It has been brought forward
as a reason for rejecting utilitarianism altogether.
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Even those who are
not troubled by replaceability of non-human animals tend to think differ-
ently if humans are concerned. So, a major challenge for those who want
to adhere to the Replaceability Argument and want to avoid its applica-
tion to humans is to exclude at least some individuals from its scope.
To my knowledge, only Peter Singer has brought forward an argu-
ment for restricting the scope of the Replaceability Argument. Singer's
argument for restricting the scope of the Replaceability Argument is
based on a particular account of welfare, which is the desire-satisfac-
tion account, in combination with a 'moral ledger model'. I will explore
several implications of Singer's account. First, Singer's account of welfare
is pessimistic. Second, Singer's account of welfare is linked to a partic-
ular conception of the harm of death. Third, Singer's account of welfare
is ad-hoc in several respects. Fourth, Singer's account of welfare is still
rather inclusive. More recently, Singer has defended a somewhat revised
position, which will also be explored.
5.1 Singer's account of welfare: desire-satisfaction account
plus moral ledger model
Singer accepts a desire-satisfaction account of welfare. This means that
Singer defines welfare in terms of desire-satisfaction. At first glance,
the Replaceability Argument works the same for a desire-satisfaction
account of welfare as for a hedonist or any other account. How, then,
can Singer restrict the scope of the Replaceability Argument? The desire-
satisfaction account as such is not sufficient for restricting the scope of
the Replaceability Argument. Suppose, for instance, that a person was
killed and replaced by another person. One could say that the killed
person, had he not been killed, would have had a certain amount of
desire-satisfaction. The being would have had many more desires,
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