Agriculture Reference
In-Depth Information
I prefer to distinguish. I would like to distinguish the Replaceability
Argument, as an argument that specifies conditions that can compen-
sate for the welfare loss caused by the killing of an animal, from another
argument, called the Logic of the Larder.
Very briefly, the Logic of the Larder claims that keeping and killing
animals for consumption actually benefits the animals in question,
because they would not exist at all if it were not for being consumed and,
according to this argument, a short, pleasant life is better for an animal
than no life at all. Clearly, the Logic of the Larder is not merely about
compensating the welfare loss that is caused by killing an animal that
could otherwise have had a pleasant future. The Logic of the Larder argu-
ment does positively promote the keeping and killing of animals under
certain conditions. This goes further and brings in an extra dimension.
Actually, Singer seems to lump together what I take to be two different
arguments as well. Yet, I think things get clearer if we separate them. I
propose to concentrate on the replacement aspect of the Replaceability
Argument and discuss the additional claims of the Logic of the Larder
argument later on, in Chapter 9. In order to justify the killing of an
animal that could otherwise have continued a pleasant life, the replace-
ment of the lost welfare would be sufficient. The aspect of replacement is
what I wish to capture in my definition of the Replaceability Argument
without mingling it with any other and further claims.
Secondly, Sapontzis says that the life of the animal must be, on balance,
'worth living'. I think that taking a position on the controversial issue of
when a life is worth living is not necessary here. This can be avoided by
saying instead that the animal should have a positive score on lifetime
welfare. More precisely, we are talking about animals that would otherwise
have had a future life with positive welfare. Assuming a hedonist account
of welfare, this means that the animal's future life would have been, on
balance, a pleasant one. Thus, the positive welfare that the animal would
have had (if it were not killed) needs to be replaced in order to compen-
sate for the welfare loss due to the killing. The past welfare is irrelevant,
and therefore, strictly speaking, the lifetime welfare is not what matters.
A third aspect that I find problematic in Sapontzis' definition is condi-
tion (b), which says that the animal must otherwise not have existed. As
I propose to understand the Replaceability Argument, this condition is
only necessary for the animal that is meant to replace the previous one.
It is not necessary for the animal that is to be replaced. Again, the reason
that Sapontzis mentions this condition also for the animal that one is
considering to kill shows that he lumps together what I take to be two
different arguments. For the other argument, the Logic of the Larder, it
Search WWH ::
Custom Search