The Replaceability Argument - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 46

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The Replaceability Argument
1 Introduction
The Replaceability Argument proposes a way of compensating the welfare
loss that is implied by the killing of animals that would otherwise have
had a happy future. Peter Singer has explicitly discussed the Replaceability
Argument in animal ethics. Apart from Singer's work, the argument is
rarely discussed. If other authors discuss the Replaceability Argument it is
always a reaction to Singer. Therefore, my exploration of the Replaceability
Argument will be presented in dialogue with Singer's take on the issue.
The underlying idea of a compensation for lost welfare can best be
grasped by looking at the numbers. Therefore, I will introduce the logic of
the argument by algebraically depicting outcomes of alternative actions
and compare these distributions of welfare. Once the underlying idea is
clear, I will give a definition of the Replaceability Argument. Subsequently,
I will specify the conditions under which the Replaceability Argument
sanctions the killing of animals. The question arises whether these condi-
tions can be met in the practice of animal husbandry. As we will see,
certain forms of animal-friendly animal husbandry might conform to
these conditions. This will lead me to the conclusion that utilitarianism
needs the Replaceability Argument in order to sanction the routine killing
of animals in the practice of animal-friendly animal husbandry.
Therefore, I will subsequently explore what it takes to embrace
the Replaceability Argument. If one wants to claim that animals are
replaceable as proposed by the Replaceability Argument, the question
comes up whether this implies that humans are replaceable as well. I
will discuss the only proposal so far (by Singer) for limiting the scope
of the Replaceability Argument. I will explore what it takes to limit
the scope of the Replaceability Argument as suggested by Singer, and
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