Animals and the Harm of Death - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 43

person might not be a good mother or vegetarian anymore, after having
taken the cure. That reason for rejecting the cure is not based on pruden-
tial value. Any view about the harm of death does not rule out that a
person cares for other things, except her own welfare. Third, another
reason to reject the cure can be that the person's life with the cure might
have less narrative unity. Attributing prudential value on the basis of
narrative unity is compatible with the foreclosure view. I have already
explained that the foreclosure view is compatible with any account of
welfare. Fourth and finally, another reason for rejecting the cure can be
that the person considers it unattractive that her values are changed in
a kind of 'unnatural way', by a medical treatment, rather than, say, by
education or maturing. Again, attributing disvalue in case of medical
interventions in one's life is compatible with the foreclosure view
because the foreclosure view is compatible with any account of welfare.
The point is that the reasons against taking the cure are compatible with
the unmodified foreclosure view. They do not provide any arguments
in favour of the modification as proposed by the Time-Relative Interest
Account. 15
What does the Time-Relative Interest Account imply when a person
is harmed without knowing it by being deprived of a benefit? Here is an
example:
Suppose Claire has an infant son, Charlie, who has a trust fund that
he may use when he turns 25. For simplicity's sake suppose, sadly, that
the trust fund is the only potential source of happiness in Charlie's
life. Claire intends to drain the fund secretly, and prevent Charlie
from ever finding out about its existence. 16
The Time-Relative Interest Account implies that draining the fund as
early as possible is least harmful for Charlie. Since the psychological
connectedness between the three-week-old Charlie and the 25-year-old
Charlie are much weaker than those between Charlie at 23 and 25, the
harm that is caused by draining the fund must be discounted. Another
implication of the Time-Relative Interest Account seems to be that
it cannot account for harms that are caused before a person exists.
Suppose, for example, that the trust fund for Charlie existed and was
drained by Claire before Charlie was born (or before he existed as a
sentient being). In that case, the Time-Relative Interest Account implies
that Claire's draining the fund was not harmful for Charlie at all. This
seems odd, because in all three cases Charlie would be equally deprived,
unbeknownst to him, of all the happiness in his life. 17