Introduction - Killing Happy Animals: Explorations in Utilitarian Ethics - page 15

harms the animals that usually end up on people's plates at least to some
degree. Therefore, their routine killing would in any case be morally
problematic. Furthermore, quite apart from the harm that death is for
the animal, the death of an animal that could otherwise have had a
pleasant future implies a welfare loss that utilitarians take into account
in moral considerations. Killing an animal that would otherwise have
had a pleasant future is problematic because it causes a loss of overall
welfare, and/or, because it causes a loss of welfare for the animal that is
killed. That welfare loss must at least be compensated for the killing to
be morally justified.
In Chapter 4 I further develop the Replaceability Argument, which
proposes a way of compensating the welfare loss due to the killing of
an animal that would otherwise have had a pleasant future. I explore
the relevant conditions under which an animal is replaceable. I also
explore which beings are replaceable, according to this argument. I
discuss Singer's arguments for restricting the scope of the Replaceability
Argument to non-persons and I point out the necessary assumptions
and implications of Singer's arguments. Furthermore, I show that the
Replaceability Argument only works if one takes the possible welfare
of the possible newly created animal into account in the evaluation of
outcomes. This possible new animal does not exist, and whether it will
exist at all depends on whether the first animal will be killed. The second
animal is therefore a 'contingent' being: whether it will exist depends
on how the moral choice (about whether or not to kill the first animal)
is decided. It is controversial whether the possible welfare of contingent
beings should be taken into account.
In Chapter 5 I introduce the dispute about whether or not to include the
possible welfare of contingent beings in the aggregation of welfare. The
Total View counts contingent beings in the aggregation of welfare, while
the Prior Existence View does not. The question arises whether both the
Total View and the Prior Existence View are really feasible views within
utilitarianism. At first glance, it is not obvious that the Prior Existence
View really fits within utilitarianism. After all, the Prior Existence View
excludes the possible welfare of a certain kind of beings, namely contin-
gent beings, from the aggregation of welfare. This might be considered
at odds with the duty to neutrally maximize welfare. Not taking into
account the welfare of a certain kind of beings is in need of justification.
I show that the refusal to count the possible welfare of contingent beings
in the aggregation of welfare is compatible with the duty to neutrally
maximize welfare under two assumptions. That is to say, in order to be a
feasible view within utilitarianism, the Prior Existence View depends on